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ABSTRACT
Computing stations networked on wireless LANs (wLANs) typically have a limited 
range of mobility: the station must always be within an access point’s coverage area. If a 
station moves outside of that area, and if it is unable to locate another base station within its 
range to perform a handover of communication connectivity responsibility, then it will ex­
perience a disruption in network services until it migrates into the coverage area of another 
wLAN. Typical causes for such losses of service include station migration to outside of the 
wLAN’s coverage area, changing environmental conditions, and “holes” within the cumu­
lative cell coverage area of multiple access points.
There could be several mobile stations simultaneously sharing the network in a 
wLAN. Each station may be stationary or in motion for part or all of its service life. How­
ever, in order to use the wLAN, it must be within service range of a access point. Theoreti­
cally, if a station is outside the access point’s coverage area, yet its own radio signal is 
within range of one of the stations which has connectivity with an access point, the isolated 
station could relay its network negotiations and traffic through a relay station which has 
direct communication with the access point. Therefore, the station nearer to the base sta­
tion acts as a relay point for the isolated station out of the access point’s range.
In this thesis, the author proposed, the design of a MAC Frame Relaying Protocol 
Extension which enables this type of dynamic relaying of network frames between stations 
in wLANs. It requires additional logic in the networking process on both the access point 
and the stations involved (both relay station and the isolated station) to support the bidirec­
tional forwarding of network traffic, and the definition of several new message types to
xv
support relay connection setup and data exchange. Both cryptography and digital signature 
concepts are employed to make secure the process of establishing of a relayed network 
session, and the exchange of data between the end stations.
To verify the validity of the protocol extension and to measure its performance, the 
protocol extension was implemented into an existing and widely accepted wireless network 
standard, IEEE 802.11. To study its effectiveness and impact on the wLAN protocol, the 
network simulation software, OPNET, was used. An existing model of IEEE 802.11 was 
enhanced with the additional logic introduced by the protocol extension.
Through simulation, it is proved that the logic presented by the protocol extension 
is able to function. In addition, the impact to overall network performance, and the quality 
of service the isolated station experiences during a relayed network session were quantita­
tively analyzed. Through the OPNET simulation, it was found that overall wLAN perfor­
mance diminished a moderate amount, while the isolated station experienced a far smaller 





In this thesis, a software-based MAC frame relaying protocol extension will be pre­
sented. It was designed to improve the coverage area of wireless local area networks (wLANs) 
that are centrally managed by a network access point. The increase in range is realized 
through an associated member station of a wLAN volunteering to share some of its re­
sources to relay MAC frames between the access point and the isolated station (a station 
that is unable to directly communicate with the access point.) This increase in service range 
is gained at the cost of some network performance since more bandwidth i> consumed to 
transfer a MAC frame between two end stations.
Because the relaying of MAC frames consumes more bandwidth (in comparison to 
direct end-to-end communication), the MAC frame relaying protocol extension is appropri­
ate only for temporary rather than permanent use. It is applicable for handling unexpected 
situations such as when a wireless station must opera te close to but outside of an established 
wLAN coverage area. The protocol extension is very useful when environmental condi­
tions and dynamics affect the size of the coverage area, or simply when poor planning has 
resulted in holes in the coverage area. Finally, it can provide a larger coverage area with 
fewer access points, especially for network administrators with small budgets willing to 
sacrifice some performance.
The protocol extension was designed to be comprehensive enough to be applicable 
to many wireless local area networking technologies as long as specific requirements by the 
original medium access controller are met. The protocol extension introduces new logic to
1
the wireless medium access control protocol while preserving the original frame layout. 
However, several new frame types have been defined. If the original MAC protocol dis­
cards unrecognized frame types, then wireless stations without the protocol extension should 
continue to function normally within a relay protocol enhanced wLAN.
The focus of this thesis is both the design of the protocol enhancement specification, 
and a proof of concept by simulating and modeling the protocol enhancement by applying it 
to a well-known wireless LAN MAC protocol developed by the Institute for Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers (IEEE), IEEE 802.11. Several new MAC frame types were defined in 
the protocol extension. Each of the new frame types is essential in establishing and termi­
nating a relayed network session, and properly exchanging MAC frames between the access 
point and the isolated wireless station. Also addressed is the issue of security. The initial 
setup of a relayed network session requires the exchange of secrets which must be protected 
by cryptographic means. Relayed frames must also be protected from both forgery and 
modification by the relay station and other members of the wLAN. All of these issues were 
considered in the design of this protocol extension, which is described in detail in Chapter 
2.
To demonstrate the functionality of the protocol extension, IEEE 802.11 was mod­
eled to support the new protocol enhancement. The changes to the existing standard, in­
cluding new frame type IDs and adjustments to the field header flags are documented in 
Chapter 3. To prove that the protocol extension works, and to measure the performance 
impact as a result of message relaying, Chapter 4 discusses the changes to an existing simu­
lation model of IEEE 802.11 in a network simulation package created by OPNET Tech­
nologies, called Optimum Network Performance (OPNET) Modeler.
The results of the simulation are presented in Chapter 5, which explores the impact 
of the protocol extension to nearby stations in addition to the station dependent on the 
relaying of frames. Overall and individual throughput, end-to-end delay, and network per-
2
formance are examined in detail, comparing the performance of a wireless LAN involving 
the use of the protocol extension with a network which avoids its use.
Chapter 6 discusses the strengths and possible improvements of the protocol exten­
sion, including design considerations and shortcomings which should be addressed in fu­
ture research. In Chapter 7, related studies in wireless networking are explored, including a 
hardware-based relayed frame system for wireless LANs.
Appendix A provides a glossary of terms used throughout this thesis, including new 
terms that were defined throughout the chapters, as well as standard definitions from other 
sources. In Appendix B, several finite state diagrams are included to provide a graphic- 
oriented presentation of the many states required by the protocol extension and the transi­
tions between each state. Appendix C presents time diagrams which depict the exchange of 




Overview of Protocol Extension Operation
The protocol extension is divided into three phases of operation. The first phase is 
the Relayed Connection Establishment phase. In this phase, the isolated station searches 
for a wLAN to attempt a relayed network connection by locating nearby stations that are 
associated with that network. Once potential relay station candidates are located and iden­
tified, the isolated station selects one to function as the relay station. At this point, the 
isolated station and the relay station establishes their segment of the relay protocol exten­
sion. The isolated station may then proceed to negotiate a relayed network session with the 
access point, with the relay station forwarding connection setup frames in between the two 
end points. If the result of the secrets exchanged between the access point and the isolated 
station yields positive, then a relayed network session is completely established.
The second phase of the extension protocol is the Relayed Network Service phase. 
In this phase, control, data, and management frames are exchanged between the isolated 
station and the access point, through the relay station. The system remains in this phase 
until one of the three stations decides to terminate its participation in the relayed network 
session.
The third and final phase, the Relayed Session Termination phase, is executed when 
one of the three participating stations initiate the termination of its involvement in the wire­
less frame relaying session. This clears all session state information and releases all partici­
pants from the relayed network session.
4
Determining When the Protocol Extension Should Be Invoked
5
As stated previously, this protocol extension is designed to provide temporary ex­
tended range access to a wLAN for situations when an isolated station is unable to establish 
direct communication with an access point. Obstacles (such as a door, a wall, or even the 
contour of the building) may change the characteristics of radio signal propagation causing 
irregularities in the coverage area. Environmental conditions such as rain, introduce addi­
tional resistance to the signal propagation, diminishing the wLAN’s effective range. [Ge99] 
A station should only attempt to establish a network session through the relayed 
frame protocol extension after failing to locate an access point to associate with under its 
normal network operation. The relayed frame protocol extension is less efficient than the 
original protocol based on both resource efficiency and throughput. This is because the 
relaying of frames requires additional bandwidth and incurs longer delays than direct com­
munication with the access point. The additional consumption of bandwidth is the result of 
network traffic transmitted to the relay station (the logical bridge between the access point 
and the station outside of communications range), which is then forwarded to its final des­
tination. The increase in delay is the result of the forwarding propagation time plus process­
ing delays incurred at the relay station.
For these reasons, the protocol extension is recommended only for temporary and 
emergency purposes, and not for long-term use or as a permanent addition to a wLAN 
infrastructure.
Minimum Requirements for Extensibility of Original Wireless LAN Technology 
The protocol extension will work only on wireless network interface hardware that
meets the following minimum requirements:
1) Broadcast frames must be supported. When the isolated station begins its 
search for prospective relay stations, it may not be aware of all of its neighboring wireless
stations. Therefore, a broadcast message carrying the request for initiating a relayed net­
work session is transmitted to find the best candidate for a relay station.
2) Acknowledged peer-to-peer frame exchanges must be supported. Since wire­
less media is more error-prone than wired media, acknowledgments must be utilized to 
ensure that frames are successfully transmitted. The protocol extension is synchronous and 
requires that packets are transmitted successfully between the access point and the isolated 
station and in the proper order.
3) The MAC frame header must have sufficient unallocated bit field patterns. 
The protocol extension introduces several new messages that require unique frames to trans­
port relay-specific data.
4) Asynchronous access to the wireless media must be supported. Since the 
isolated station is located outside of the access point's coverage area, the relay station must 
be able to receive frames originating from a source that do not have control of the network.
5) The access point must be able to receive frames that are not directly ad­
dressed to it, as well as be able to transmit frames with a different originator address. This 
is necessary to compensate for the hidden node problem, where the isolated station is out of 
radio range of other members of the wLAN with which it has a relayed network session. 
[Di96, Ge99]
Pre-Protocol Extension Execution Configuration
Before a wireless isolated station attempts a relayed frame network session, it must 
have a list of the wireless LANs to which it has access privileges in order to engage the 
protocol extension. This list is called the NAP List. Each entry in the NAP List is indexed 
by the physical address of the access point controlling a particular wLAN; the entry con­
tains information that the isolated station needs to establish a relayed frame session with 
that access point. The information includes, but is not limited to:
6
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• The physical characteristics of the wLAN. The isolated station needs this informa­
tion in order to properly synchronize and communicate with the stations associated with the 
wLAN. For example, network data rate, radio frequency, and hopping sequences (for Fre­
quency Hopping Spread Spectrum networks). [Ge99, Di84]
• A public key, identified as CKPu , that has been issued to the isolated station. This 
key is used to encrypt authentication information exchanged between the isolated station 
and the wLAN’s access point. Only the access point has the private key which can decrypt 
the ciphertext generated by the isolated station. This key is used only during the connection 
setup phase of a relayed network session.
• A private key, identified as CKPr , that has been previously issued to the isolated 
station. This key is used to decrypt authentication information transmitted to the isolated 
station from the wLAN’s access point. Only the access point has the public key which can 
encrypt the ciphertext so that no entity can transmit false authentication information to the 
isolated station. This key is used only during the connection setup phase of a relayed net­
work session.
• Another private key, identified as DSKPr■ , that has been previously issued to the 
isolated station. This key is used to generate a digital signature which the access point 
examines to validate authentication messages transmitted by the isolated station. The ac­
cess point has the corresponding public key which verifies the authenticity of the digital 
signature. This key is used only during the connection setup phase of a relayed network 
session.
• Another public key, identified as DSKPut., that has been issued to the isolated 
station. This key is used to validate the digitai signature stamped onto authentication mes­
sages from the access point. Only the access point has the private key which matches the 
public key held by the isolated station. This key is used only during the connection setup
phase of a relayed network session.
8
8 A password, passphrase, or some other form of secret. This is transmitted to the 
access point during the relayed network session establishment phase which proves the iso­
lated station’s identity to the access point.
The access point also needs a list to store information about the wireless stations 
that could attempt a relayed frame network session. This list is called the Relayed Frame 
Clients List. Each entry is indexed by the physical address of the supported isolated station. 
The information contained in the list entry must have at least the following entries:
r,
8 A public key, identified as CKPun> that has been issued to the access point. This 
key is used to encrypt authentication information exchanged between the access point and 
the isolated station referenced by the list entry. Only the isolated station has the private key 
which can decrypt the ciphertext generated by the access point. This key is used only 
during the connection setup phase of a relayed network session.
8 A private key, identified as CKPrx. that has been issued to the access point. This 
key is used to decrypt authentication information transmitted to the access point from the 
isolated station referenced by this list entry. The isolated station has the public key which 
can encrypt the ciphertext so that no entity can obtain the secrets passed to the access point 
through relayed network connection setup messages. This key is used only during the con­
nection setup phase of a relayed network session.
* Another private key, identified as DSKPrr, that has been previously issued to the 
access point. This key is used to generate a digital signature which the isolated station 
examines to validate authentication messages transmitted by the access point. The isolated 
station has the corresponding public key which verifies the authenticity of the digital signa­
ture. This key is used only during the connection setup phase of a relayed network session.
8 Another public key, identified as DSKPu ix. that has been previously issued to the 
access point. This key is used to validate the digital signature stamped onto authentication 
messages from the isolated station. Only the isolated station has the private key which
9
matches the public key held by the access point. This key is used only during the connec­
tion setup phase of a relayed network session.
• A password, passphrase, or some other form of secret which is required by the 
access point to verify the identity of the isolated station.
Phase 1: Establishment of a Relayed Frame Network Session
Upon invoking the protocol extension, the NAP Entry Pointer is initialized to the 
first entry in the NAP List. Each time the index in the NAP Entry Pointer is advanced, a 
counter, NAP Retry Counter, is reset. The task of this counter is to prevent the protocol 
extension from making too many unsuccessful relayed network session connection attempts 
with a particular wLAN. Its default value, however, should still allow enough retries to 
counteract the effects of message loss as a result of frame collision.
The isolated station (from here on referred to as S.), then configures the network 
interface’s medium access hardware to conform to the physical properties of the access 
point that manages the wLAN that is stored in the list entry. If the radio encoding technique 
requires synchronization with peer stations (such as Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum 
[Di84, Ge99]), S. listens for the network traffic of neighboring wireless stations and at­
tempts to synchronize itself with them; some of these stations are potential relay station 
candidates if they are members of the target wLAN. If the encoding technique requires 
synchronization, and if S. cannot synchronize itself with peer members of the target LAN, 
then the attempt to activate the protocol extension for that NAP Entry is aborted. The NAP 
Entry Pointer is advanced to the next entry in the NAP List, and the synchronization process 
is attempted again.
If there are no complications with S.‘s ability to exchange messages with its neigh­
boring stations (for example, S. failing to synchronize with nearby stations using FHSS), S. 
then attempts to establish a relayed communication session between itself and a relay sta­
tion with a series of messages defined for this purpose. A timeline of the message exchange 
is portrayed in Figure 2-1.
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S. begins the attempt by broadcasting a Request fo r Service (RFS) message to all of 
the stations within transmission range belonging to the target wLAN. The RFS message 
alerts receiving wireless stations that the broadcasting station is searching for a station to 
serve as a relay station in a relayed network session.
S. initializes a timer, Max RRFS Wait, immediately after broadcasting the RFS mes­
sage. This timer is necessary to limit the amount of time S. spends waiting for a response, 
protecting it from indefinitely waiting should no station issue a response. If the timer ex­
pires, S. decrements the NAP Retn: Counter. If the counter is greater than zero, it rebroad­
casts the RFS message. Otherwise, if the NAP Retry Counter reaches zero, then it assumes
11
that the vvLAN S. is attempting to join is either not within range or is in a state that does not 
allow any additional relayed network sessions. Sj then selects the next wLAN in its NAP 
List. If the NAP Entry Pointer had already addressed the last entry in the list, then the 
protocol extension aborts, and reports a connection failure.
If at least one station responded to the RFS message, then S. proceeds with the next 
step of the protocol extension setup. Any further responses to the RFS message are dis­
carded after this point in the connection setup phase.
The default value for the Max RRFS Wait timer provides enough time for the RFS 
message to propagate through the wireless medium to all potential relay stations within 
range, for any receiving station to absorb the message and process it (including any decision 
making processes), and for any stations that wish to respond to the RFS to transmit their 
response (including consideration for medium access contention.) The default value for the 
Max RRFS Wait timer, however, cannot be too large of a value such that early responders to 
the RFS message may quit waiting for a response message from S.. This would indicate 
which responding station has been chosen to serve as the relay station.
The suggested format of the Request for Service message is specified in Figure 2-2.
AxiD
Figure 2-2: Request for Service (RFS) message format
The field AJD  identifies the access point of the target w'LAN, which is typically its 
hardware address. Additional fields, such as minimum network quality of service require­
ments information, may be encoded in the message.
This broadcast alerts the wireless stations that received the RFS message that there 
is a station seeking to join the wLAN through the relayed frame protocol extension. The 
receiving stations examine the AJD  field encoded in the RFS message. If it does not match
the identity of the access point with which the station is associated, the receiving station 
discards the RFS message and does not transmit a response.
If the A ID  field matches the identity of the access point to which the receiving 
station is associated, it may elect to respond, thereby declaring itself a candidate relay sta­
tion. The simplest implementation of the receiving station’s decision-making process may 
either be ‘yes', if the station unconditionally decides to provide relay station services to 
other wireless stations, or ‘no’, if the station unconditionally decides not to. A more mature 
implementation for determining whether or not to respond to the RFS message may con­
sider factors such as:
• Can the receiving station handle the additional load on its limited resources as a 
result of serving as a relay station? The protocol extension’s logic requires an additional 
examination of the frame header to determine if the frame is actually addressed to itself or 
to another station through itself; this effort increases the wLAN device driver’s demand for 
CPU time. If it is a relayed frame, then it might have to temporarily cache the frame until 
other relayed frames arrive; this creates an extra burden on the station’s memory resources. 
Finally, the relay station will need to forward the received frame(s) to their final destination. 
This decreases the availability of the network bandwidth for the relay station’s own needs.
• Can the receiving station handle the additional power usage demanded by the wire­
less frame relay protocol extension? Because S. is outside the range of the access point, any 
centralized power savings management techniques by the access point might be rendered 
unusable. The inability to temporarily power down the antenna due to the risk of losing any 
pending messages from S. can conceivably shorten the battery life of a relay station.
• Is the receiving station significantly mobile? If the wireless station reassociates 
frequently with other wLANs, then it would be a bad candidate for a relay station. A relay 
station that reassociates with another wLAN will terminate the relayed network session
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between the isolated station and the access point. A less mobile or fixed station is therefore 
more desirable than a considerably more mobile station.
• Can the network handle the additional overhead that the relaying protocol exten­
sion generates? Each frame transported through the relayed network session is transmitted 
twice; the stations within communication range of Si and the relay station will sense that the 
wireless medium is twice as active for the same message than what would be experienced if 
Si was within normal range of the access point.
If the receiving station elects to declare its candidacy as a relay station, it constructs 
and transmits a Response to Request for Sen’ice (RRFS) message to S.. The suggested 
format of the RRFS message is described in Figure 2-3.
A X!D S ta tus(S xi) S ta tus(N etw ork) S ta tus(LocS tab ility )
Figure 2-3: Response to Request for Service (RRFS) message format
The A ID  field identifies the access point that the responding station is associated 
with, to verify that the RRFS message originated from a station that is a member of the 
current target wLAN. The field Status(Sxi) provides S. with information about the qualifica­
tions of the responding station as a relay station. The information contained in the field may 
be a simple fitness value calculated by the responding station. It may also be a series of 
values describing the capabilities of the responder. The field Status(Network) describes, in 
a similar fashion, the state of the wLAN from the responder’s perspective. Finally, the field 
Status(LocStability) describes how stable the responder is in regards to its location and its 
relationship with both the access point and S.. If the station is always in a fixed location, a 
non-mobile flag could be set to state this condition. If a short history of signal strength 
between the access point and the responding station is available, Status(LocStablity) could 
report the average signal strength along with its standard deviation. The signal strength of
the RFS message is another factor which may be stored in Status(LocStability). This pro­
vides S. with an idea as to which potential relay stations enjoy the best receiving signal-to- 
noise ratio.
Tne responding station initializes a timer. Max ARS Wait, immediately after trans­
mitting the RRFS message. The purpose of this timer is to establish a life-span on the state 
information that the responding station maintains while waiting for a reply from S. for a 
given RFS message. This prevents the station from indefinitely allocating resources for 
those isolated stations which may never choose the responder as a relay station. If the timer 
expires and there was no response from S., then any state information regarding S.‘s relayed 
network connection setup request is discarded. The timer is reset if another RFS message is 
received from S.. The default value of Max ARS Wait allows enough time for Sj to evaluate 
the prospective relay stations, and time for S. to generate a response message.
Additional information about the responding stations that are not stored in the RRFS 
message may be gathered and should be considered when S. chooses a responder for its 
relay station. For example, the signal strength is an important consideration when choosing 
a responding station to serve as a relay station. It is more desirable to choose a station with 
a clear, strong signal and a high signal-to-noise ratio, than a weak signal and a low signal-to- 
noise ratio that could be more prone to errors. [Ge99]
As S. receives multiple RRFS messages from the responding stations, it stores them 
in an ordered list, called the Responding Relay Station Candidates List (RRSCL). This list 
is sorted either by FIFO, or by a computed level of fitness. After the Max RRFS Wait timer 
has expired (which occurs before the Max ARS Wait timer on any of the responding stations 
has expired), S. chooses the first entry in the RRSCL as the first responder to complete the 
Isolated Station to Relay Station relationship of the protocol extension. S. signals the cho­
sen responding station by transmitting an Acceptance o f Relaying Service (ARS) message
14
to it. The ARS message does not carry any field information in its payload. The frame type 
ID and the origination address fields provide the chosen station with sufficient information.
S. initiates a timer, Max ARS_ACK Wait, immediately after transmitting the ARS 
message. This timer is used to establish a limit on how long S. will wait for a response from 
its chosen candidate relay station. The default value of Max ARS_ACK Wait is long enough 
to accommodate the transmission of the ARS message, time for the chosen relay station to 
absorb and process the message, and for the responding station to transmit a reply. If this is 
the first time S. transmitted an ARS message to the currently chosen responding station, the 
counter ARS Retry Counter is initialized. If the timer expires, S. decrements ARS Retry 
Counter. If ARS Retry Counter has a value greater than zero, it retransmits the ARS mes­
sage and waits for a reply. If the counter reaches zero, then it assumes that there is a prob­
lem with the currently chosen candidate station, and the next entry in the RRSCL is se­
lected. If S. exhausts every entry in the RRSCL, it decrements the NAP Retry Counter, and 
considers the failure at this stage of the protocol extension as similar to not receiving any 
responses to an RFS message.
If the wireless station that received the ARS message cannot find any state informa­
tion about a potential relayed network session with S. (which may occur if the receiving 
station has reinitialized itself or if the Max ARS Wait timer has expired), it simply discards 
the message. Otherwise, if state information about S. is found, then the receiving station 
cancels the Max ARS Wait timer. The chosen responding station (from here on referred to as 
S J ,  then transmits an Acceptance o f Relaying Service Acknowledgment (ARS_ACK) mes­
sage back to S., and cancels the Max ARS Wait timer. There is no timer set by Sxi to ensure 
that S. received the ARS_ACK message. If S. transmits another ARS message, Sxj simply 
responds with another ARS_ACK message Like the ARS message, the ARS_ACK mes­
sage is defined only by the frame type ID and the origination address fields. These fields 
provide the chosen station with sufficient information.
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The first phase of the relayed connection setup is complete when S; receives the 
ARS_ACK message. At this point in the protocol extension execution, S. and Sxi have 
established a relayed network session between each other, enabling S. the ability to negoti­
ate a relayed network session with the access point through Sxi.
In the second phase of the relayed connection setup process, more connection setup 
messages are exchanged: between the isolated station and the access point, with the relay 
station in the middle forwarding the messages from one end point to the other. Figure 2-4 
provides a timeline of all of the connection setup messages exchanged in this phase.








Figure 2-4: Timeline of message exchange for negotiations between S. and A.x.
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S. begins negotiation with the access point (from here on referred to as Ax) by trans­
mitting a Request fo r Relayed Communication Session (RRCS) message to Sxj. After vali­
dating that there is an active relay session between S. and itself, Sxj forwards the RRCS 
message on to Ax. The suggested format for the RRCS message is illustrated in Figure 2-5.
dsig S jID S tatus(S i) enc Rsi P W (S j)
Figure 2-5: Request for Relayed Communication Session (RRCS) message format
The SID  field is set to the hardware address of S.. Ax uses this unique address in a 
key field search to locate S.’s entry in its Relayed Frame Clients List. Status(S.) contains 
optional status information regarding S.. It may be used for declaring Quality of Service 
requirements or other information useful in Ax‘s decision in determining if it should grant a 
relayed network session to S..
PW(S.) is a secret known only between S. and Ax. This secret is proof to Ax that the 
station claiming to be S. is indeed S., and not some other entity that is pretending to be Sr 
The field R contains a random number generated by S.. The random number and password 
fields form the plaintext which is encrypted with the key CKPusi. The resulting ciphertext is 
denoted in Figure 2-5 as enc, which graphically encapsulates Rsi and PW(S.). The random 
number is introduced into the ciphertext to prevent a cryptographic attack known as the 
“Man in the Middle Attack”. This attack is discussed in this chapter under the section “A 
Survey of Authentication and Cryptography used in the Protocol Extension”.
In addition to public-key cryptography, the protocol extension relies on digital sig­
nature technology to decrease the likelihood of an unauthorized wireless station launching 
a successful attack. The use of digital signatures prevents the relay station (or any other 
station which is authenticated to the wLAN) from modifying the RRCS and other similarly 
protected messages. To generate a signature, a hash of the concatenation of the fields SID,
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Status(S), and enc, is signed with DSKPrsj. The resulting signature is stored in the dsig 
field.
S, initiates a timer, Max RRCS Wait, immediately after transmitting the RRCS mes­
sage. This timer enforces a ceiling on the amount of time that S. waits for a response from 
Ax. The default value assigned to the timer takes into consideration the sum of the propaga­
tion delays experienced by the RRCS message as it passes from S. to Sxj, and from Sxi to Ax. 
The timer also takes into consideration not only the time Ax needs to process the connection 
request attempt, but also the propagation delays experienced by the response message as it 
traverses from Ax to S. through Sxi. Additionally, the busyness of the network is factored 
into the timer’s initial value, providing compensation for the delays incurred by waiting for 
an open time slot on a busy network or by retransmitting a frame in the event of a frame 
collision.
In conjunction with the timer, the counter RRCS Retry Counter is utilized to manage 
the number of retry attempts tried by S.. The RRCS Retry counter is initialized to a default 
value, and decremented each time the RRCS message is transmitted. If the counter reaches 
zero, S; concludes that something is wrong with the network and that further connection 
establishment attempts with this particular wLAN will unlikely to yield a successful con­
nection. S. then transmits a Terminate Relay Session (TRS) message to S . The format of 
the TRS message is described in Figure 2-6.
S j I D
Figure 2-6: Terminate Relay Session (TRS) message format
The TRS message contains only a single field, S.JD, which identifies which S. the 
message is targeted for.
The reception of a TRS message notifies Sxi that the relayed connection session has 
been terminated, releasing Sxi from its relaying station responsibilities. S. then advances its
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NAP Entry Pointer to the next entry and tries again. If there are no furthei entries in the list, 
then a connection error should be reported and the protocol extension terminated. Since the 
message originated from S;, and Sxi has not observed the completion of a relayed network 
session between S. and A , the TRS message is not forwarded to A x.
The reception of an RRCS message notifies Ax that there exists a wireless station 
(S,) located outside of the coverage area, that has already established the initial relayed 
network session protocol with a member of its wLAN (Sxi), and that wishes to associate 
with the wLAN through the relayed frame protocol extension. Av then determines if the 
message is legitimate (i.e., not forged or modified during transport). If it is valid, Ax decides 
if a relayed network session should be granted to S..
The verification process involves a series of “challenges” to ensure the authenticity 
of the relayed network session setup request. The first challenge is the verification of the 
digital signature supplied in the dsig field in the RRCS message. If the hash of the concat­
enation of the RRCS fields SID, Status(S.), and enc does not match the same value retrieved 
from dsig after it has been decrypted with DSKPnar, then the message is considered to have 
been tampered. Ax discards the message, and transmits a TRS message back to Sxi, and 
copies the value in the RRCS’s SID  field into the SID  field of the TRS message.
If the digital signature matches, but the enc field cannot be decrypted with CKPrm, 
or, if the enc field can be decrypted, but the PW(S.) field does not contain the secrets that Ax 
expects, a TRS message is sent back to S. through S .. Ax will never grant a relayed network 
session to S. if any of the three previous events occur.
The reception of a TRS message notifies Sx. that the relayed connection session has 
been terminated, releasing Sxi from its relaying station responsibilities. Since the TRS mes­
sage originated from A , Sxi forwards the TRS message to the S. specified in the SID  field 
before clearing the state information containing the relayed network session between Sxi 
and S.. Once S. receives the TRS message, it advances its NAP Entry Pointer to the next
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entry and tries again. If there are no further entries in the list, then a connection error is 
reported and the protocol extension is terminated.
On the other hand, if the digital signature and the secrets provided by Sj are valid, Ax 
may proceed to deciding whether or not to grant S_ a relayed network session.
The process of deciding whether a relayed network session should be granted to Si 
could be as simple as an unconditional 'yes’ or ‘no’. A more mature decision-making pro­
cess for determining whether or not Ax should grant Si a relayed network session considers 
factors such as:
• If S. specified a minimum level of Quality of Service, can the network guarantee it 
throughout the duration of the relayed network session?
• Can the access point handle the additional load? If Ax has been experiencing high 
utilization for significant periods in its history, the addition of a new station to the wLAN 
could increase the load level, which would yield longer delays.
• Can the network handle the additional traffic? Stations that are members of a 
network with a significantly high load will experience significant additional delays caused 
by medium access contention and the recovery of lost packets resulting from frame colli­
sions. A relayed network session could aggravate an already congested network (wLAN) 
through the necessary transmission of a relayed data frame as it finds its way to its destina­
tion end-station.
If A, elects to deny the authenticated/validated S. a relayed network session, it pre­
pares a Relayed Communication Denied (RCD) message. The purpose of the RCD mes­
sage is to notify S. that its connection request has been denied, so that any resources in­
volved in the existing connection setup between S. and S . may be released. The suggested 
format for the RCD message is depicted in Figure 2-7.
The SID  field is set to the same value as the SJD in the RRCS message that A 
received earlier. This field is necessary since Sxj could potentially be serving multiple iso-
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SjID enc Rsi S ta tus(A x)
Figure 2-7: Relayed Communication Denied (RCD) message format
Iated stations, and requires some address field to p r o p e r l y  route the message to its destina­
tion. 1 he Field Ru is assigned the random number initially generated by S . This randomizes 
the message’s ciphertext as well as reduces the likelihood of having an external attacker 
transmit an RCD message to S. with the intention of disrupting the relay protocol. The Field 
Status(AJ provides optional status information, such as the reason why the relayed network 
connection request was denied. The fields R . and Status(AJ combine to form the plaintext 
which is encrypted with the key CKPuax. The resulting ciphertext is denoted in Figure 2-7 
as enc, which graphically encapsulates the protected Fields.
Like the RRCS message, the RCD message makes use of a digital signature to pro­
tect it from unauthorized modiFication. A hash is calculated from the concatenation of the 
SID  and enc Fields. This hash is then encrypted with the key DSKPrix, creating the message’s 
digital signature which is stored in the message’s dsig Field. The RCD message is then 
transmitted to the relay station, Sxi, which forwarded the original RRCS message. No tim­
ers or counters are initialized since Av does not expect any further messages on behalf of S..
When S receives an RCD message, it examines the address stored in its SID  Field. 
If the address does not match the address of any S. which the station has agreed to provide 
relay station, services to, it simply discards the message. On the other hand, if there is a 
match, the RCD message is forwarded on to S.. After successfully forwarding the RCD 
message, Sxj clears itself of all state information regarding the relay session. Sxi no longer is 
responsible for forwarding messages on behalf of Sr After S. receives and validates the 
RCD message using DSKPusj, it clears itself of any relayed network session state informa­
tion generated for A , and advance its NAP Entry Pointer to the next list entry. If there are no 
further entries in the list, a connection error should be reported, and the protocol extension
terminates.
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Alternatively, if Ax decides to grant S. a relayed network session, it prepares a Re­
sponse to Relayed Communication Session (RsRCS) message. The purpose of the RsRCS 
message is to notify that its connection request has been accepted, and to provide a secret, 
symmetric digital signature key which is to be used for signing messages after the relayed 
network session establishment has completed. The suggested format for the RsRCS mes­
sage is displayed in Figure 2-8.
dsig S jlD S ta tus(A x) enc Rsi Rax D S K S
Figure 2-8: Response to Relayed Communication Session (RsRCS) message format
The RsRCS message carries many of the fields which are present in the RCD mes­
sage. The SJD field is set to the same value as the S.ID in the RRCS so that Sxi can properly 
route the RsRCS message to its destination. Status(AJ carries optional information regard­
ing the status of Ax and the network that it manages. The Rs. field is assigned the random 
number that was initially generated by S., to provide assurance to the isolated station that 
the RsRCS message is the response for its most recent relayed network session attempt in 
addition to its normal role of randomizing the ciphertext.
A also generates a random number which is stored in the R field. An added pur- 
pose of this random number is to further differentiate the current connection establishment 
message exchanges from past exchanges, to make it less likely that a previous exchange of 
relayed network session connection messages could interrupt the current connection setup 
message exchange.
To decrease the amount of time taken by an end station when generating a digital 
signature for messages in the Relayed Data Transport protocol phase, Ax generates a new 
digital signature key, DSKS. This key is different for each and every relayed network ses­
sion, using a symmetric encryption algorithm as opposed to a public key algorithm. A 
symmetric key algorithm is more desirable for the duration of an established relayed net­
work session because it is much faster than a public key algorithm. [Sc96] Using a new key 
also helps in detouring cryptoanalysts who have managed to break the keys from previous 
sessions from using them to forge messages in the current relayed network session. This 
new symmetric digital signature key is stored in the field DSKS.
The fields /? ,, R , and DSKS, are combined to form the plaintext which Ax encrypts 
with CKPuax. The resulting ciphertext is stored in the enc field. The hash of the concatena­
tion of the fields SJD. Status(A ), and enc, is encrypted with DSKPrn, forming the digital 
signature of the message which is stored in the dsig field.
Once the RsRCS message has been generated, it is then transmitted to the relay 
station, Sxi, which forwarded the original RRCS message to Ax. Unlike the RCD message, 
Ax requires a timer Max RsRCS Wait to limit how long it should maintain the relay session 
setup information for S. while it waits for an acknowledgment of Ax granting a relayed 
network session. The default value for the Max RsRCS Wait timer is large enough to accom­
modate the time the RsRCS message requires to propagate through Svj to S., and takes into 
consideration the busyness of the network and Sxi. The time for S. to absorb and process the 
RsRCS message is accounted for, as well as the propagation time for its response message 
while it is relayed back to Ax. If the Max RsRCS Wait timer expires without a response from 
S., Ax discards all relay session setup information for S., From this point, S. will have to 
resend the RRCS message to begin the process again.
After receiving the RsRCS message, Sxi examines the address stored in the S.ID 
field. If the address does not match the address of any S. to which the station has agreed to 
provide relay station services, it simply discards the message. On the other hand, if there is 
a match, the RsRCS message is forwarded on to S.. Unlike the reception of a RCD frame, 
Sxj retains its relayed network session information for S..
After a successful reception of the RsRCS message, S. validates the message with 
the digital signature stored in the dsig field. If the hash of S JD, Status(A ), and enc does not
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equal the hash extracted from dsig after it has been decrypted with DSKPut., the message is 
discarded. Otherwise, the message is considered untampered. The ciphertext in the enc 
field is decrypted CKPr ., and the Rx. field’s value is compared with S.’s record of the ran­
dom number it had generated for the RRCS message. If the numbers fail to match, then the 
RsRCS message received is not a valid response message for the current relayed network 
session S; is attempting to establish. The message is then discarded without resetting the 
Max RRCS Wait timer.
In the event that the RsRCS message received is authentic, the contents of the mes­
sage are extracted and stored in the relayed network session state information maintained 
by S.. S. notifies Ax that it successfully received the RsRCS message before Ax’s Max 
RsRCS Wait timer expires. This notification to Ax is transported through an Acknowledg­
ment o f Relayed Communication Session (ARCS) message. The format for the ARCS mes­
sage is depicted in Figure 2-9.
dsig  ! S jID enc 'ax
Figure 2-9: Acknowledgment of Relayed Communication Session (ARCS) message format
S.’s hardware address is stored into the SID  field, required for Ax to properly iden­
tify the originator. The Rax field is set to the value of the random number generated by Ax, 
which S. received in the earlier RsRCS message, proving to the access point that this ARCS 
is intended for the current relayed network connection setup phase. Rm is encrypted with 
CKPux. and the resulting ciphertext is stored in the enc field. A hash of SID  and enc is 
generated and is then encrypted with DSKPr., creating a digital signature for the message 
which is stored in the dsig field. S. then transmits the ARCS message to Sxi, which is then 
forwarded to A .
X
S. initializes a timer, Max ARCS Wait, in order to place a ceiling on the amount of
time the station spends waiting for Av to transmit its response. The default value of the
timer takes into consideration the amount of time required for ARCS to propagate through 
the network to Sxi, and then to Ax. The time for Ax to absorb and process the message is 
taken into consideration, especially when significant load is reported in the RsRCS message’s 
Status(AJ field. Finally, the response propagation time between Ax and Sxj, and finally from 
S . to S , are also considered. A counter, ARCS Retry Counter, is initialized to a default value
xi r  -
on the first transmission, and is decremented each instance the timer expires when a re­
sponse was not received from Ax. If the counter is greater than zero, S. retransmits the 
ARCS message. Otherwise, if the counter reaches zero, S. falls back to the previous stage, 
transmitting an RRCS message to Sxi, which in turn is forwarded on to Ax.
If Ax receives the ARCS message before its Max RsRCS Wait timer expires, it veri­
fies that the message is authentic by challenging the digital signature in the dsig field. If the 
hash of SID  and enc fail to match the hash recovered from the decryption of dsig with 
DSKPu , the message is discarded. The Rax field is extracted from the ciphertext in the enc 
field (using CKPr^), and compared with the random number which Ax generated earlier. If 
the numbers do not match, the message is discarded. Otherwise, at this point, Ax may 
consider the relayed network session between itself and S. to be complete, and data frames 
may be transported through Sxi between the two end stations. Ax signals S. that the relayed 
network session protocols has been completed by issuing it an acknowledgment to the ARCS 
message. This message is carried in the Acceptance o f Relayed Communication Session 
Acknowledgment (AJRCS_ACK) message. The format for this message is described in Fig­
ure 2-10.
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dsig S jID enc Rsi
Figure 2-10: Acknowledgment of Relayed Communication Session Acknowledgment 
(ARCS_ACK) message format
S.’s hardware address is stored into the SID  field, required for Sxi to properly iden­
tify the message’s final destination. The R field is set to the value of the random number
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generated by S , which Ax received in the earlier RRCS message, proving to the access point 
that this ARCS_ACK is intended for the current relayed network connection setup phase. 
/?h. is encrypted with CKPun and the resulting ciphertext is stored in the enc field. A hash is 
generated from the concatenation of the S.ID and enc fields; this hash is encrypted with 
DSKPrn to form the message’s digital signature, and is stored in the dsig field. Ax then 
transmits the ARCS_ACK message to Sxi, which in turn forwards the message on to S.. Ax 
does not initialize any further counters or timers; if S. fails to receive the ARCS_ACK mes­
sage, it will retransmit the ARCS message.
Once S. receives the ARCS_ACK message, it should confirm its authenticity through 
checking its digital signature. If the hash of SID  and enc does not match the hash obtained 
from dsig after it has been decrypted with DSKPu^., the message should be discarded. After 
the digital signature has been confirmed, Rr. is extracted from the enc field (which is de­
crypted with CKPrJ, and compared with the R that S. generated for the earlier RRCS 
message. If the numbers do not match, the ARCS_ACK frame is discarded; the ARCS 
message is transmitted to Ax again once the Max ARCS Wait timer expires and if the counter 
ARCS Retry Counter is still greater than zero. Otherwise, the relayed network session be­
tween S. and Ax is considered successfully established. Data frames may now be trans­
ported through the relayed protocol extension.
Phase 2: Relayed Data Transport
The transport of data frames through the relayed frame protocol extension is a sim­
pler process than the relayed network session establishment process. The protocol exten­
sion defines two different relay data frames:
9 The Relay Data Frame Class 0 (RDFO) message
• The Relay Data Frame Class 1 (RDF1) message.
The RDF1 message can transport relay descriptor data inside its payload block along 
with the upper layer data, while the RDFO message instead relies on a descriptor message,
the Relayed Frame Information (RFI) Message to transport relay data. The RFI message is 
transmitted immediately after an RDFO message.
If the original MAC frame has a field which denotes the amount of data in the frame’s 
payload block and if there is sufficient free space in the payload block, an RDF1 message 
may be used to transport data through the relayed network session. The payload length field 
remains unchanged, stating the size of the upper layer data that it is transporting. However, 
immediately after the last octet of data in the payload block, additional relay data is in­
serted. The receiving station is able to locate this data by recognizing the RDF1 frame and 
addressing the fixed-size data following the last octet. The format of the embedded relay 
data is described in Figure 2-11.
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SjID S rc/D est ds ig
Figure 2-11: Relay Frame Descriptor Data
The SID  field is set to the physical address of S.. If the originating station is S., this 
field is necer ary for Sx. to validate that the RDF1 frame originated from an expected source 
(a station which has previously established a relayed network session through itself), and 
for Ax to determine the originator of the message for its own frame reception processing. 
On the other hand, if the originating station is Ax, the SID  field is required by Sxi to deter­
mine if that station has a relayed network session established through it, and if it does, to 
forward the message to its final destination.
Because the relay protocol must transport frames through a relay station, the Src/ 
Dest field is required to preserve the true source or destination address of the relay station. 
For an RDF1 message to be transmitted to S. from A , this field contains the address of the 
frame's originator, since the SID  field provides adequate information for Sxi to determine its 
final destination. If the RDF1 message originated from S., the final destination address of 
the message is stored in the Src/Dest field.
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The contents of the payload, including the attached SID  and Src/Dest fields, must 
be protected from unauthorized modifications during its transport between the end stations. 
A hash of the concatenation of these fields is generated, and is then encrypted with DSKS to 
create the message’s digital signature. This signature is stored in the dsig field.
If the original MAC frame does not have a field that denotes the amount of data in 
the frame’s payload block, or if it does, but there is insufficient free space in the payload 
block, an RDFO message must be used to transport data through the relayed network ses­
sion. The data frame is structured the same as an unmodified data frame in the original 
wLAN architecture, with the exception that the frame is identified as a RDFO frame rather 
than a standard MAC data frame.
A hash of the RDFO message’s payload is generated and then encrypted with DSKS, 
creating a digital signature. This signature, along with the final destination of the frame, 
and a unique identifier (such as the RDFO message’s frame sequence number) is stored in a 
queue called the Outgoing Relay Queue. Entries are added to and removed from the queue 
on a First-In First-Out (FIFO) order. Ax has one Outgoing Relay Queue for each S. with an 
active relayed network session.
An RDFO or an RDF1 message that was generated by either Ay or S., is eligible to 
enter the wLAN hardware’s transmitter queue. Before an RDF1 message is placed into the 
transmitter queue, the end station checks the contents of the Outgoing Relay Queue. If the 
queue is empty, the RDF1 message is immediately placed into the transmitter queue. How­
ever, if the queue has at least one entry, an RFI message is generated and placed into the 
transmitter queue ahead of the RDF1 message in order to preserve the FIFO order that the 
relayed protocol extension uses to transport relayed data frames.
If the message is an RDFO message, it is placed immediately into the transmitter 
queue. The end station then checks the length of the Outgoing Relay Queue. If the number 
of entries in the queue (including the RDFO message just placed into the transmitter queue)
is equal to the constant Max Outgoing Relay Queue Length, then an RFI message is gener­
ated and placed in the transmitter queue immediately after the RDFO message. The Max 
Outgoing Relay Queue Length constant is set to a value large enough to promote efficient 
use of the wireless bandwidth without further increasing relay delays due to time spent by 
the relay station and destination end station waiting for relay data frame descriptor data. 
This constant is also necessary to prevent too many RDFO message from being transmitted 
ahead such that the RFI message cannot carry enough descriptor information about the 
messages which preceded it in its payload block.
Although there is an upper bound to the number of previously transmitted RDFO 
messages waiting for the RFI message, there is another potential source of messaging delay. 
This delay occurs when packets from the network layers above the MAC layer arrive at a 
very slow rate. The Outgoing Relay Queue may fill up too slowly, causing time-out prob­
lems for the upper layers. To alleviate this problem, an upper bound is placed on the amount 
of time that may pass between the first transmission of an RDFO message and its corre­
sponding RFI message. After the queue is cleared, and a new relayed data frame descriptor 
entry is placed into the queue, a timer, Force RFI Timer, is initialized to a default value and 
started. The default value is set to a reasonable value to prevent upper layer time-outs, i.e., 
it is highly dependent on the nature of the behavior of the upper layers. If the timer expires 
before the number of entries in the queue reaches Max Outgoing Relay Queue Length, then 
an RFI message is automatically generated to pass the descriptor data for the entries waiting 
in the queue. The timer is stopped whenever an RFI message is generated. The format of 
the RFI message is portrayed in Figure 2-12.
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Figure 2-12: Relayed Frame Information (RFI) message format
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The field, # Entries, contains the number of relay data frame descriptors that are 
carried in the RFI message. Each descriptor provides relaying information about the RDFO 
messages which were transmitted ahead of the RFI message.
If the RFI message originates from Ax, the S ID is set to the target Si and the Src/Dest 
Field is set to the address of the frame’s originator. If the originator is Sjt S./D is set to its 
own hardware address, and the Src/Dest field is set to the final destination for the packet it 
is describing. The dsig field for each descriptor protects the corresponding RDFO’s payload 
block from unauthorized modification. The unique identifier for each of the previously 
relayed packets is stored separately from the relay descriptor data in the PkID field(s). The 
reason for this is because Sxi must be able to translate the unique identifier to the new unique 
identifiers of the RDFO messages when they are forwarded to their final destination. The 
hash of the concatenation of the fields # Entries and the relay descriptor data section is 
encrypted with DSKS', the resulting signature is then stored in the p_dsig field. The unique 
identifier block cannot be protected since it must be adjusted by the relay station.
The descriptor information is arranged in chronological order of the RDFO frames 
which were transmitted ahead of the RFI frame. For this reason, reliable synchronous trans­
port is crucial for the proper operation of the protocol extension. Incoming relay data mes­
sages that arrive from Ax and S. are stored in separate queues by Sxi. The source endpoint is 
notified that the message was successfully received by the relay station. This ensures that 
the exchange of messages remains synchronous.
If the message received is an RDF1 message, it is immediately queued to the proper 
transmission queue. If the originator of the message is S., the message is queued for trans­
mission to A  . On the other hand, if the originator is Ax. Sxi examines the SID  field. If the 
SID  field addresses a valid S. station, the RDF1 is then queued for transmission to the 




If the message received is an RDFO message, it is queued into the proper Incoming 
Relay Queue. Because the MAC frame relay protocol extension cannot assume that the 
header block does not have an unused address field where the final destination of the RDFO 
message may be stored, the existence of the unique identifier is crucial for the protocol 
extension to work.
Messages from different S.’s are queued separately for efficient organization. Also, 
since all of these isolated stations have a relayed network session established with the only 
access point in the wLAN, all incoming relay data messages from Ax are stored in a separate 
queue. This is needed because the RDFO frame header is unable to carry distinguishing 
information to provide Sxi clues as to which isolated station is the intended destination. 
Therefore, all RDFO messages are stored in a single Incoming Relay Queue for messages 
arriving from Ax.
When an RFI message arrives, Sx. examines the originator. If the RFI message 
arrived from S., the messages in the Incoming Relay Queue for messages that arrived from 
S. is placed in the transmission queue for transport to Ax. Sxi takes note of the new unique 
identifier (the sequence number for the packet to be transferred to the end station) so that 
when it comes time to transmit the RFI message, it can replace the old unique identifier with 
the new unique identifier. This allows the receiving end station to properly correlate the 
relay descriptor data with the RDFO messages it received. Once the RFI’s PkID fields are 
updated, the RFI message is placed in the transmission queue targeted for Ax.
On the other hand, if the RFI arrives from Ax, it must search the Incoming Relay 
Queue for all messages that originated from the access point for all of the RDFO messages 
whose unique identifier match the PkID entries of the RFI message. The SID  field is used 
to determine which isolated station should receive the sequence of RDFO messages. If the 
station cannot be located, all of the RDFO messages identified in the RFI message, and the 
RFI message itself, are discarded. If the session entry is located, the RDFO messages are
placed in the transmission queue in the order they were received from Ax, taking note of 
each unique identifier frame transmitted to S.. These unique identifiers replace the appro­
priate PkID values in the RFI message before it is transported to S..
The actions taken by the end stations, Ax and S(, arc dependent on the type of mes­
sage received. If the message is an RDF1 message, the relay descriptor data is extracted 
from the frame’s payload. The hash of the concatenation of RDF1 's payload, SJD, and Src/ 
Dest are compared with the hash extracted from the decryption of dsig using DSKS. If the 
signature challenge fails, the message is discarded. If the message is proven to be authentic, 
the message is accepted.
If the message is an RDFO message, it is stored in the Incoming Relay Queue since 
the RDFO message relies on the RFI message to carry relay descriptor data. Once the RFI 
message is received, the end station verifies the authenticity of the message by comparing 
the hash of the # Entries and the relay descriptor data fields with the hash obtained from 
decrypting p_dsig with DSKS. If the challenge fails, the message is discarded. If the mes­
sage is proven to be authentic, then the RFI message is considered valid, and the RDFO 
messages received ahead of the RFI message may be addressed.
Each RDFO message is removed from the queue in the order they arrived (maintain­
ing the FIFO stream of data between the two end points.) As each RDFO message is ex­
tracted from the queue, its corresponding relay descriptor data is extracted from the RFI 
message’s payload. The authenticity of each individual RDFO message is challenged. A 
hash of the RDFO’s payload is generated, and it is compared with the hash extracted from 
dsig after it had been decrypted with DSKS. If the hashes match, then the message is con­
sidered authentic and may be accepted. Otherwise the message should be discarded.
After an RDFO or an RDF1 message has been authenticated, the receiving station 
(Ax or S.) may process it. If the processing station is S., the payload is passed up to the upper 
layers, and is reported to have originated from the address stated in the Src/Dest field.
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If the receiving station is Ax, its processing depends on the true destination of the 
data frame.
1) If the Src/Dest field references a station which is not a member of the wLAN 
managed by Ax, then the message is forwarded onto the distribution system which connects 
the access point to a wired network. The destination address of the message is set to the 
value stored in Src/Dest. If the original MAC protocol uses the wLAN station’s address as 
the originator of the message to be transmitted on the distribution system, then the address 
of S. is stored in the message’s originator address field.
2) If the Src/Dest field in the message’s corresponding relay descriptor data 
references another member of the wLAN managed by Ax, then Ar transmits the data frame 
under (through normal or relayed MAC protocols) the name of S., forging it if necessary. If 
the original wLAN architecture supports the access point performing role of receiving and 
retransmitting frames between clients to solve the hidden node problem [Di96,Ge99], such 
as IEEE 802.11, then the normal MAC protocols are used to transmit the message to its final 
destination.
When other members of the wLAN wish to transmit a message to Sr Ax must be able 
to intercept the message and forward it to S. through the relaying protocol. Because of this, 
Sj must ignore non-relay messages addressed to it to avoid receiving messages twice.
Phase 3: Relayed Network Session Termination
The termination of the relayed network session is the simplest phase of the Wireless 
MAC Frame Relay Protocol Extension. There are three possible scenarios when this phase 
occurs.
1) The isolated station (S.) initiates the termination of its relayed network ses­
sion. This occurs if S. discovers an access point with which it may engage in normal, non- 
relayed network protocols, or if the user of the isolated station terminates network access 
when the system is shut down.
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2) The relay station (Sxi) initiates the termination of its role in the relayed net­
work session. This occurs if Sxi decides to reduce its system load, to shut down, or reasso­
ciate with a different wLAN.
3) The access point (Ax) initiates the termination of the relayed network ses­
sion. Events likely to trigger this include hardware resets and preventive measures to re­
duce wLAN load from critical levels.
If Si terminates the relayed network session, it generates a TRS message, and trans­
mits it to S .. After Sxj acknowledges the reception of the message, Si clears itself of all data 
associated with the relayed network session. Sxi then extracts the SID  field from the TRS 
message, and forwards the message on to Ax. After Ax acknowledges receiving the TRS 
message, Sxi can safely eliminate all traces of its responsibilities in the relayed network 
session for S.. After acknowledging the reception of the TRS message, Ax purges all data 
associated with the relayed network session after retrieving the identity of the station from 
the SID  field, effectively terminating the protocol extension.
If Ax terminates the relayed network session, it generates a TRS message, and trans­
mits it to Sxi. After Sxi acknowledges the reception of the message, Ax may clear itself of all 
data associated with the relayed network session. Sy. then e -.tracts the SID  field from the 
TRS message, and forwards the message on to S.. After S. acknowledges receiving the TRS 
message, S . can safely eliminate all traces of its responsibilities in the relayed network 
session for S.. After acknowledging the reception of the TRS message, and verifying that 
the SID  field does refer to S., S. erases all data associated with the relayed network session, 
effectively terminating the protocol extension. This process repeats itself for each relayed 
network session that A decides to terminate.
X
Finally, if S ; terminates the relayed network session, it generates two TRS mes­
sages for each isolated station that it is serving. Both TRS messages for each S. have the 
address of S. in the message's S.ID field. One message is transmitted to Ax, the other to S..
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Once both Ax and S. acknowledge the message, Sxi clears itself of that relay session. This is 
repeated for each relayed network session that Sxi may wish to terminate. Ax extracts the 
SID  field from the TRS message, and e'iminates the active relay session it addresses. S. 
validates that the S.ID matches the address of the station; if it does, the station terminates the 
relayed network session, clearing all state information.
A Survey of Authentication Protocols and Cryptography used in the Protocol Extension
As stated before, the protocol extension is highly dependent on cryptographic and 
digital signature technology in order to preserve the authenticity of messages exchanged 
between Ax and Sr Encrypting the secrets passed in the RRCS and the RsRCS message is 
vital to prevent unauthorized access to a wLAN through the protocol extension. The use of 
digital signatures prevents other stations from modifying the contents of the messages ex­
changed between the end stations.
Encryption in the protocol extension is realized through the use of a public key 
algorithm. The user of public key cryptography simplifies the distribution of keys inside a 
relayed network environment. Because it is computationally hard to derive the private key 
out of the public key, only one set of public and private keys is required to protect any 
relayed network connection establishment messages transmitted to the access point. This is 
useful because the access point is a central authority which all stations must address. On 
the other hand, in order to ensure the security of messages transmitted to the isolated sta­
tions, each isolated station must have a different set of private and public keys from one 
another, since there could be many isolated stations associated to the wLAN. Examples of 
good public-key encryption algorithms which fall under this classification include RSA, 
ElGamal, and Rabin. [Sc96]
Both symmetric and public-key algorithms are used for the generation and authenti­
cation of digital signatures in the protocol '" tension. The public-key digital signature keys 
are used during the connection setup phase, and are reused for each connection setup at­
tempt. A digital signature key for a symmetric algorithm is used only during the Relayed 
Data Transport phase, and is different between each relayed network session. Using a sym­
metric algorithm over a public-key algorithm for exchanging digital signature data has sev­
eral advantages:
• It reduces the number of keys involved in generating a digital signature to one key, 
which is used for generating and validating a digital signature. If a public-key algorithm 
was used, the number of keys that would have to be maintained between the isolated station 
and the access point could increase to as many as four (two public, and two private keys.) 
This key must be kept secret between the access point and the isolated station.
• Symmetric algorithms are at least 1,000 times faster than public-key algorithms.
[Sc96]
• By reducing the number of times that the public-key algorithm is used to the au­
thentication message exchange (which is a total of four messages for any one relayed net­
work session, in comparison to the thousands or millions of data packets which may be 
exchanged after the session has been established), the difficulty for cryptoanalysts to derive 
these keys through a chosen-plaintext attack becomes much harder. [Sc96]
« The variance of the digital signature key between relayed network sessions denies 
cryptoanalysts the ability to use plaintexts of previous sessions for chosen-plaintext attacks. 
Even if an attacker is successful in deriving the digital signature key, it will not be valid in 
future relayed network sessions. [Sc96]
Any public-key algorithm may also be used for generating a digital signature. The 
private key is used to encrypt the data to be signed, which produces the signature. The 
public key is used to decrypt the signature. This works because it is computationally hard to 
derive a private key out of the public key, even if their roles have been reversed. Similarly, 
any symmetric algorithm may be used since only the end stations will have access to the
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key; a good example for this purpose is DES. There also exists other digital signature 
algorithms, such as DSA, GOST, and ESIGN. [Sc96]
In the interest of reducing the computation time of the digital signature algorithm 
and the space requirements for the resulting signature for a particular unit of data, a one­
way hash function is implemented. Examples of one-way hash functions include Snefru, 
MD4. MD5, and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). Hashing the data to be signed reduces the 
size from the data’s original length to the size of the hash. As stated by Schneier, “Speed 
increases drastically and, since the chances of two different documents having the same 
160-bit hash are only one in 2160, anyone can safely equate a signature of the hash with a 
signature of the document.” [Sc96]
In the definition of the RRCS message, a reference was made to a cryptographic 
attack called the “Man in the Middle Attack”. This is an active cryptographic attack in 
which an entity between two communicating parties (such as Sxi, which is between Si and 
Ax, but it could be any other station which is associated to the wLAN) intercepts and alters 
messages, pretending to each end point to be the other. [Sc96] As long as the cryptographic 
keys shared between S. and Ax have not been compromised, an attacker can only capture the 
relayed frames exchanged between S. and A,.
If the relayed connection session establishment process did not randomize its 
ciphertext, an outside entity could attack the protocol extension by using previously cap­
tured messages. An attacker could attempt a denial of service attack against an access point 
by using captured connection setup messages of previous relayed network sessions from 
many different isolated stations. If successful, this will result in a situation where legitimate 
isolated stations would be denied access to the network through the protocol extension. An 
existing relayed network session could be unexpectedly reset at the access point by trans­
mitting to it the same connection establishment messages. The protocol extension would 
break down because the isolated station would be ignorant of this reset. Its’ session digital
signature key would be invalidated after the access point had generated a new key for the 
“new session”. Conversely, an attacker could fool an isolated station into believing that it 
has successfully established a relayed network session when, in fact, the connection setup 
request was denied, or never even received, by the access point. This would result in the 
isolated station transmitting messages it expects to be relayed, terminating only after net­
work time-outs becomes indicative of a communications failure.
By randomizing the ciphertext portions of the connection setup messages, the bit 
patterns of each message varies between each relayed network session. This variation re­
duces the likelihood of a captured relayed network connection establishment messages be­
ing used in the future as an attack. This is because the encoded random number pairs are 
unlikely to be identical given a sufficiently large range of values for each number. Any 
messages which carry unexpected random numbers are simply discarded.
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CHAPTER III
IMPLEMENTATION EXAMPLE: IEEE 802.11
Although the MAC Frame Relaying Protocol Extension defined in this thesis is 
intended to be generalized enough such that it may be applied to nonspecific wLAN archi­
tectures, the wLAN architecture defined by IEEE 802.11 influenced the protocol extension’s 
structure and basic requirements. Therefore, because the networking model defined by 
IEEE 802.11 easily meets the protocol extension’s basic requirements, the availability of 
simulation models based on this standard, and the rapidly growing deployment of IEEE 
802.11-based technology, a modified version of IEEE 802.11 which supports relayed net­
work sessions was developed and is explored in this chapter.
Introduction to IEEE 802.13
The IEEE 802.11 standard is one of the newest additions to the family of interna­
tionally recognized IEEE 802 standards. It was proposed by Victor Hayes in May 1991, and 
was finally completed in June 1997. The benefit of IEEE 802.11 in comparison to other 
proprietary wLAN protocols is the standardization of wLAN technology. This standardiza­
tion promotes vendor interoperability, decreases development time and costs, and ensures a 
stable migration path for future wLAN technology. The official title of IEEE 802.11 stan­
dard is “IEEE Standard for Wireless LAN Medium Access (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) 
Specifications”. [Ge99]
Of the seven layers defined by the OSI Reference Model, the 802.11 standard de­
fines the functionality of both the MAC (which is one half of the Data Link Layer) and 
Physical layers. This is consistent with other physical layer standards which are members
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of the IEEE 802 family (such as Ethernet and token ring). The task of these layers is to 
deliver MSDUs (MAC Service Data Units) between LLCs. The Logical Link Control (LLC), 
the upper half of the Data Link Layer, defined by IEEE 802.2 “specifies the mechanisms for 
addressing stations across the medium and for controlling the exchange of data between 
two stations". This separation of functionality between layers allows the layers oriented to 
•pecific physical characteristics to be exchanged without requiring modifications to the 
LLC and the above layers. Therefore, the same LLC defined by 802.2 may be used by 
IEEE 802.3, IEEE 802.5, and IEEE 802.11. [Ge99]
IEEE 802.11 defines two topologies. One topology is an environment where wire­
less stations communicate directly to one another without the influence of a centralized 
network controller (an ad hoc network) which is called an Independent Basic Service Set 
(IBSS) network. The other topology is the Extended Service Set (ESS), which uses access 
points to link wLANs to a distribution system, such as an Ethernet network. [Ge99] The 
latter topology is the topology model that benefits from the MAC Frame Relaying Protocol 
Extension.
Access to the wireless media is controlled by two coordination functions. The Dis­
tributed Coordination Function (DCF) is required for any implementation of TEEE 802.11. 
Under the DCF. stations use a Carrier-Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/ 
CA) protocol before transmitting a packet. The other coordination function, the Point Co­
ordination Function (PCF) is an optional protocol which uses a centralized coordinator 
(usually the access point) to provide contention-free packet exchange. Stations which are 
members of the wireless LAN transmit only when given permission by the central coordi­
nator. [Ge99]
Structure of the IEEE 802.11 MAC Frame 
Like the other official network standards that, are members of the IEEE 802 family, 
such as Ethernet (802.3) and Token-Ring (802.5), 802.11 defines an overall MAC frame
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format. This structure is shared by all of the frame types (management, control, and data) 
defined in the standard. A graphical display of the MAC data frame format presented by 
[Ge99] is provided in Figure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1: IEEE 802.11 MAC frame format [Ge99, p. 142]
The Frame Control field contains descriptor information about the frame, the details 
of which is documented after exploring the MAC frame format. The Duration/ID Field 
contains a duration value, the meaning of which is dependent on the type of MAC frame. In 
most frames, it carries information that identifies the duration of the next frame to be trans­
mitted. Other stations on the network monitor this Field, holding off their transmissions 
based on the duration information. [Ge99]
The Address 1 through 4 Fields contain different types of addresses, depending on 
the frame type. Typical addresses stored in these Fields include the address of the transmit­
ting station, the destination station, and the access point. The length of each address in 
IEEE 802.11 is 48 bits. The location of these addresses among the four address Fields vary 
depending on the frame type. [Ge99]
The Sequence Control field (the leftmost four bits) contains both the fragment num­
ber and the MSDU sequence number (the remaining 12 bits.) The Frame Body (referred to 
as the Payload Block in Chapter 2) is a variable-length field which carries information that 
pertains to the specific frame being sent. In the case of a Data frame, this is a unit of data 
which was passed down from the upper layers. The last field, the Frame Check Sequence 
(FCS) carries the result of a 32-bit frame check sequence using the Cyclic Redundancy 
Check (CRC). This CRC is used to check all of the fields ahead of the FCS to detect any 
errors in the packet that may have occurred during its transmission. [Ge99]
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The Frame Control field itself carries many subfields which carries additional con­
trol and descriptor information. The arrangement of these subfields are shown in Figure 3- 
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Figure 3-2: Frame Control format [Ge99]
The Protocol Version field defines the version of the IEEE 802.11 MAC frame used. 
Currently, 0 is the only valid value, although that may change with future revisions of the 
standard. The Type field defines what type of frame it is (Management, Control, or Data; 
Resen’ed is not used under the normal MAC protocol). The Subtype field further classifies 
the frame type, based on the frame classification defined in Type. The To DS field denotes 
whether the packet should be routed to the distribution system (the infrastructure network 
which the access point provides access to for all member stations of the wLAN). Con­
versely, the From DS field denotes if the packet came from the distribution system. [Ge99]
The IEEE 802.11 standard supports the fragmentation of MSDUs. By breaking up 
an MSDU into smaller pieces, the probability of a successful transmission increases due to 
the smaller frame size. The 802.11 standard defines a parameter, aFragmentationThreshold 
such that when the size of an MSDU exceeds this parameter, it is broken up into smaller 
fragments. Each fragment is transmitted in individual data frames, each requiring separate 
acknowledgments. The More Frag field denotes if the current MSDU has any further frag­
ments following the current frame. If it is set to 0, then this frame contains the final frag­
ment. Previous fragments, if any, may be combined together to form the complete MSDU. 
A 1 indicates that this frame is either the first or a middle fragment, and that more are on the 
way. [Ge99]
The Retry field denotes if this frame is the retransmission of an earlier frame; a 
frame is retransmitted after a period of time if the receiving station failed to respond with an
acknowledgment. If the frame is a retransmission, the field is set to 1. Otherwise it is set to 
0. The Power Management field indicates the power management mode which the sending 
station will be set to after transmitting the frame. A value of 1 indicates sleep mode; a value 
of 0 indicates that the station will continue to be active. The More Data field denotes that 
the sending station has more frames to transmit to the receiving station after this frame; it is 
primarily for stations that arc in power-saving mode, alerting the receiving station to be 
ready for more frames to come (such as remaining fragments for the current MSDU if it has 
been fragmented.) The WEP field notifies the receiving station that the WEP algorithm has 
processed the frame’s payload. The value is 1 if the payload has been encrypted, otherwise 
the value is set to 0. The final field. Order, is set to tell the receiving station that frames must 
be processed in order. [Ge99]
IEEE 802.11 Defined Frame Types
As stated earlier, IEEE 802.11 defines four separate frame types: the Management 
frame type, the Control frame type, the Data frame type, and the Reserved frame type. 
These separate types group related operations together.
Frames that fall under the Management class are responsible for the establishment 
of initial communications between wireless stations and access points. Management ser­
vices include Association, Authentication, Disassociation, and Deauthentication. Associa­
tion is the process of mapping a station to the distribution system through an access point; a 
station may associate with no more than one access point, but an access point may be asso­
ciated with multiple stations. Association is needed in an architecture in which multiple 
access points are connected to the distribution system. The mapping provides a path for 
packets to properly reach the end station. Disassociation is the termination of the associa­
tion service. Authentication is the process where a station positively identifies itself when 
establishing a network connection; this prevents unauthorized stations from gaining access
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to the wireless network. Deauthentication is a notification that a station wishes to terminate 
its current network session. [Ge99]
Control frames are a class of frames that provide functionality to assist in the deliv­
ery of data frames. Frame types that fall under this classification include Acknowledgment 
(ACK), Request to Send (RTS), and Clear to Send (CTS). The Acknowledgment frame is 
used by a receiving station to signal the transmitting station that a frame was received suc­
cessfully and without error. A station that fails to receive an acknowledgment after a short 
period of time retransmits the frame that it assumes has been lost. The Request to Send and 
Clear to Send frames are part of a mechanism built into IEEE 802.11 that allows a transmit­
ting station to temporally gain a contention-free period of time to transmit a data frame to its 
destination station. This is especially useful during periods of time when network utiliza­
tion is nigh, or for dealing with the collisions resulting from traffic from stations which are 
undetectable to the transmitting station (hidden nodes). [Ge99]
The frames belonging to the Data frame class is used for transporting data, such as 
MSDUs, from source to destination. In an infrastructure in which an access point controls 
the wLAN, the To DS, From DS, and Address fields in the data frames may vary, as follows: 
[Ge99]
• In a peer -to-peer transport of a data frame, From DS and To DS are both 0. Address
1 contains the address of the destination station, Address 2 contains the address of the source 
station, and Address 3 contains the address of the access point. [Ge99]
* If the data frame originated from the distribution system. From DS remains 0, but 
To DS is set to 1. Address 1 continues to carry the address of the destination station, Address
2 contains the address of the access point, and Address 3 contains the address of the source 
station. [Ge99]
° If a station wishes to send a data frame to a station beyond the wLAN (the destina­
tion resides on the distribution system or beyond), To DS is set to 1, and From DS is set to 0.
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The value assigned to Address 1 is the address of the access point (the station in the wLAN 
which has physical access to the distribution system). Address 2 is assigned the address of 
the transmitting station, and Address 3 contains the address of the destination of the frame. 
[Ge99]
The Reserved class of frames is composed of a range of bit field patterns which are 
unused in a normal IEEE 802.11 client. In a normal, unmodified IEEE 802.11 network, any 
frame which uses any of the reserved bits are ignored by the receiving station. This default 
behavior allows wireless stations which are enabled with the protocol extension to function 
among unmodified stations without throwing these stations into an error state. [Ge99] 
Modifications to IEEE 802.11 to Support the Protocol Extension
As stated before, IEEE 802.11 supports all of the protocol extension’s requirements. 
The standard supports unacknowledged frame broadcasts, and most management, control, 
and all data frames are supplemented with acknowledgment frames to notify the sending 
station that its frame was received successfully and are intact. The Frame Control field in 
the MAC header has a sufficient number of unallocated bit patterns to support identifying 
the new frame types as defined in the protocol extension. IEEE 802.11 allows asynchro­
nous access to the wireless media, meaning that any station may transmit as long as no other 
transmissions are taking place. [Ge99]
With the access point and the relay station, access to the media may be controlled by 
the DCF or the PCF. With the latter, relayed packets are transmitted during the relay station’s 
turn. Since the isolated station is likely out of communications range with the point coordi­
nator, it usually will depend on the DCF for media access. Since DCF is a requirement for 
all implementations of the IEEE 802.11 standard, this should not pose a problem.
All entities in a relaying-enabled IEEE 802.11 wLAN will require more memory for 
proper system operation. The amount of additional memory required is dependent on the 
type of station involved in the protocol. For a relay station, additional memory is required
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for records which contain state information about each active relay station it has taken part 
in. In addition to these records, memory must also be allocated for the Incoming and Out­
going Relay Queues.
The additional memory requirement for the isolated station includes not only the 
state information which must be maintained for the setup and lifetime of a relayed network 
session, but also the Outgoing Relay Queue, and the NAP List. In addition to the mandatory 
contents of each entry in the NAP List (access point address, cryptographic keys, etc.), there 
must be descriptor information about the wLAN managed by that specific access point. 
This descriptor data includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the data rate, radio frequency, 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) security information, hopping code and dwell time (for 
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum-based wLANs), and Management Information Base 
(MIB)-deflned attributes such as aFragmentationThreshold. [Ge99]
The access point’s additional memory requirements must be large enough to main­
tain state information for pending and active relayed network sessions for each isolated 
station, as well as the Outgoing Relay Queue, and the Relayed Frame Clients List. There is 
no need for additional descriptor information about the wLAN, since its characteristics are 
dictated by the access point.
Since the isolated station is not able to directly communicate with the access point, 
the station must rely on IEEE 802.11 ’s IBSS functionality to communicate with nearby 
stations. The authentication protocol defined by IEEE 802.11 are not used in the establish­
ment of a relayed network session since the protocol extension performs a significant amount 
of authentication challenges on its own. Likewise, IEEE 802.1 l ’s association process is 
unnecessary in a relayed network session. The isolated station is automatically mapped to 
the access point once the connection setup phase has been completed. Deauthentication 
and disassociation of a relayed network session is performed through the protocol extension 
as well, never through IEEE 802.11 ’s deauthentication and disassociation services.
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The RF[ broadcast, and the messages exchanged between the isolated station and 
the relay station always have the To DS and From DS Fields set to 0, since there is no 
distribution system involved in the message transfers between these two stations. Relay 
messages exchanged between the access point and the relay station also have the To DS and 
From DS fields set to 0. This is because the relay message is generated by the protocol 
extension and is not the actual frame which is transported to or from the distribution system 
(that frame is encoded and recovered from the relayed data stream.)
Relay messages are transported through IEEE 802.11 ’s data frame structure (see 
Figure 3-1.) This is because it is more flexible than the control or management frame 
formats. Since relay messages can be as large as standard data frames, the RTS/CTS opera­
tion may be invoked to reserve the wLAN for a time sufficient to transmit the frame without 
collision.
Allocation of Unused Frame Type Bit Patterns 
Since the existing standard had sufficient free bit-sequences to represent all of the 
message types defined by the relayed frame protocol extension (meeting the third require­
ment), individual message types were assigned individual bit patterns. If an existing wLAN 
architecture has an insufficient number of unused bit sequences to represent all of the relay 
message types, it may be possible, depending on the flexibility of the original MAC proto­
col, to combine multiple functions under a few message types. An ID type could be stored 
in the payload section; however, this approach will increase the complexity of the relayed 
frame protocol extension implementation.
With the exception of the data transport messages RDFO and RDF1, all relay-type 
messages have been assigned subfield bit patterns underneath the Reserved Frame type. 
The data transport messages have been assigned unused subfield bit patterns under the Data 
Frame type. Refer to Table 3-1 for the complete listing of the associated relay message 
types with the available frame type field patterns.
Table 3-1: Frame type bit field patterns with associated relay message types
48
Frame Type Subfield (bits 7,6,5,4) Relayed Message Type
Reserved Type











D ata ty p e
(bit 3, bit 2) = 10 1000 RDF1
1001 RDFO
CHAPTER IV
IEEE 802.11 WITH FRAME RELAYED PROTOCOL EXTENSION SIMULATION
Introduction to OPNET
The simulation software, Optimum Network Performance (OPNET) [OpOl], was 
the simulation tool selected to prove that the frame relaying protocol extension works, and 
to measure its performance. Developed by OPNET Technologies, this powerful simulation 
tool enables researchers to explore the performance of various network configurations, and 
to experiment with modifying existing standards, through its large library of models. One 
of the models in its library is a simple implementation of the IEEE 802.11 standard, which 
supports both IBSS and ESS wLANs. It was this model that was modified to support the 
frame relayed protocol extension.
In OPNET, a network simulation is composed of models organized in a hierarchical 
structure which promotes modularity and object/code reuse. A project’s network model, in 
OPNET, is composed of one or more Node modules. Node modules are the servers, switches, 
routers, physical inter-node link connections (i.e., a 100 Mbps ethemet link), workstations, 
application profiles, and much more. Figure 4-1 presents the node structures for an access 
point and a wireless station in OPNET’s implementation of IEEE 802.11.
Each Node module is composed of one or more process models. Process models are 
objects which define low-level functionality, behavior, and data structures. Examples of 
process models include the implementation of OPNET’s model of IEEE 802.11 ’s MAC 
layer and the higher layers in the protocol stack (i.e., TCP and Applications). Process mod­
els are interconnected with other process models inside of a node, creating an inter-process
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Figure 4-1: OPNET node model diagrams, (a) Access Point node model, (b) Wireless 
Station node model.
communication system for the exchanging of data between process model entities. The 
process model for wlan_mac, OPNET's implementation of IEEE 802.11, is presented in 
Figure 4-2.
These Process models are composed of State Variables, Temporary Variables, asso­
ciated code blocks, Header blocks, and atomic State objects which are arranged in a Finite 
State Machine (FSM). Inside of these State objects is proto-C code which the simulation 
executes at run-time.
OPNET supports a massive range of statistics which may be gathered during the 
execution of the simulation. A small sample of the types of statistics which can be gathered 
include throughput, end-to-end delay, retransmissions, backoff slots, transmission queue 
lengths, and more. For more information about OPNET’s implementation of IEEE 802.11 
in its wlan_mac module, refer to [OpOO].
Model Modifications to Support the Frame Relayed Protocol Extension
The basic finite state machine model of OPNET’s implementation of IEEE 802.11, 
wlan_mac, was largely left unchanged, with the exception to the code contents of the FSM 
states BSS_INIT and IDLE. Most of the modifications to the existing model are found in
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Figure 4-2: Process model for the OPNET wlan_mac IEEE 802.11 model.
the State and Temporary Variable blocks, the Header Block, and the Function Block. There 
were several new statistics defined that record the activity (primarily throughput) of the 
protocol extension functionality, and several input variables that denote whether or not the 
protocol extension should be enabled, which station that an isolated station would choose 
for its relay station (in the simulation, the PJFS message is not broadcasted), and maximum 
number of pending RDFO messages before forcing an RFI message.
The new entries inside of the State Variables primarily provide storage for model 
configuration, pointers to new data structures which carry new information specific to the 
protocol extension, and statistic handles.
Several new data structures were defined inside of the Header Block. They serve the 
purpose of storing data which must be maintained by the access point, by the relay station, 
and by the isolated station, including the Incoming and Outgoing Relay Queues. The new 
relay message types (RFS, etc.), and identifiers that denote the status of what point in the 
relayed network session setup phase a station is currently in, were also defined in this sec­
tion of the model’s code. The READY_TO_TRANSMIT macro was modified to support 
the self-generated interrupt which schedules the generation of relayed network session con­
nection messages.
The new code which allows the model to support the protocol extension is within 
the Function Block. The changes in this section of the code can be summarized as follows:
• In the State Variable and Statistic Handle initialization function (wlan_mac_svjnit), 
new code was inserted to support the initialization of the new State variables with either 
initial zero values, or values assigned from the configuration of the node module. Handles 
for new statistics are allocated and stored in the Process module’s State Variables.
• In the function wlan_higher_lciyer_dala__arrival, which receives packets arriving 
from the upper network layers, new code had to be inserted to determine if the station is 
dependent on the frame relaying protocol extension to transport the packet to its final desti­
nation. The result of that decision selects the queueing function with which the incoming 
packet is processed. Queuing functions include the original wlan_hlpk_enqueue function 
for when relaying is not required or for packets requiring relaying for successful transport, 
the jag_ax_relayjilph_enqueue__data/jag_si_relay_hlph_enqueue_data functions. The task 
of the enqueue functions is to place the arriving packets into the transmission queue after 
performing any necessary preprocessing.
• The functions responsible for frame transmission are wlan_Jmme_tmnsmit and 
wlan_prepare_frame_to_send. These functions were modified to recognize the new mes­
sage types defined by the protocol extension, and to encode them in IEEE 802.11 ’s data 
frame format. The modifications to the settings of the To DS and From DS fields referred to 
in Chapter 3 were performed here. Relay message frames support the model’s built-in RTS/ 
CTS flow control mechanism.
0 Frame relay protocol extension communication setup messages are scheduled by a 
self-generated interrupt, identified by JAG_RELAY_INTERRUPT. The expiration of the
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Force RFI Timer timer generates another interrupt, JAG_RFI_INTERRUPT. The function 
wlan_interrupts_process, the wireless LAN model’s interrupt processing function, was ex­
tended to support these new interrupts. In the case of a JAGJRELAY_INTERRUPT. the 
function jag_relay_hlpk_enqueue is called if the station is the isolated station or the relay 
station. If the station is an access point, the function jag_ax_relay_hlph_enqueue. These 
functions arc responsible for the generation and queuing of the connection setup messages. 
In the event that a JAG_RFI_INTERRUPT w'as invoked, either the function 
jag_ax_rfi_hlph_enqueue ovjagjsi_rfi_hlph_enqueue is called, depending on what type of 
station (access point or isolated station) received the interrupt.
* The function that processes packets that arrive from the physical layer, 
wlan_physical_layer_data_arrival, was modified to support the processing of all of the 
relay message types defined by the protocol extension. To simplify the code structure of the 
function, the processing for each new message type was relocated to an array of additional 
functions. The successful reception of connection setup messages updates the station’s 
connection setup status flags. The reception of relayed data frames and relay descriptors 
are processed depending on the station type. If the station is an end station, the incoming 
data messages are queued until an RFI message is received. Once an RFI message is re­
ceived, all of the queued messages are then passed up to the upper layers. If the station is a 
relay station, the messages are queued until an RFI message is received, after which the 
queued messages and the RFI are forwarded to the final end station.
• Because this implementation of the frame relayed protocol extension requires that 
the flow of relayed data messages and RFI messages cannot be interrupted, the retry limit 
imposed on MAC frames must be ignored for relay frames. This required a small modifica­
tion in the wlan_Jrame_discard function to check if the frame currently being considered 
for discard is a relay frame. If it is, then the frame is never discarded. Otherwise, the 
original frame discard procedure is allowed to continue.
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The modifications to the BSS_INIT state occur in its entry code. In this state, the 
station discovers the existence of the other stations which are part of the subnet. If the 
station is an access point, it examines the distance between itself and other individual sta­
tions in the subnet. If the distance exceeds the radio range specified for the simulation, a 
Relayed Frame Clients List entry is created for that station. If the station is not an access 
point, and it detects that the distance between itself and the subnet’s access point is greater 
than the established radio range, it marks itself as an isolated station and prepares itself to 
begin the relayed communication session setup procedure. This occurs in the IDLE phase, 
which follows the BSS_INIT phase. Finally, if the station is not an access point, and is 
within the coverage area of the subnet’s access point, the station initializes a data structure 
which prepares it for the possibility of becoming a relay station later in the execution of the 
simulation.
In the IDLE state, the enter code was modified to support much of the connection 
setup process. When the station enters the IDLE state, it examines the status of its relayed 
connection setup. If the system is in a state where it should prepare a relay connection 
message, it schedules a JAG_RELAY_INTERRUPT, and updates its status to denote that an 
interrupt for the requested message type has been requested. This new status value is read 
by wlan_interrupts_process to determine what kind of message to generate.
Simulation Configuration
The layout of the simulation was carefully designed to examine the effects of the 
protocol extension when it is engaged. The time span of each simulation, whether or not it 
invokes the protocol extension, is one hour. This is a sufficient period of time for network 
activity to level out after every wireless station has had the opportunity to establish its 
communication session with the servers present in the model.
A File Transfer Protocol (FTP) application was chosen to drive the network traffic in 
the simulation. FTP traffic is favorable because data transfers are serialized (as opposed to
parallel data transfers, which may occur with web traffic), and are therefore less bursty. By 
minimizing the burstiness of each station’s network activity, the negative effects of the frame 
relaying protocol extension on throughput and delay should be more apparent when exam­
ining the simulation results.
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Figure 4-3: Layout diagram of the Ethernet distribution system and FTP Servers.
There are two FTP servers involved in the simulation, depicted in Figure 4-3 as a 
pair of tower computer systems. Both are connected via 100 megabit Ethernet links to a 
switch which is labeled Ethernet Switch. The server denoted as Si FTP Server provides 
exclusive FTP services to the Isolated Station. All of the other wireless stations choose the 
server FTP Server for their respective file transfers. This separation of Si’s FTP traffic from 
that of the other stations allows a better insight into the amount of performance lost to Si, 
and to the other collective stations, by the protocol extension. The size of files on the Si 
FTP Server were uniformly distributed between one and five megabytes. For the FTP Server, 
the file size were distributed uniformly between 500k and one megabyte; smaller file sizes 
were chosen because the FTP Server would be serving multiple clients concurrently. Each
server had a single processor, and was able to process 2 megabytes of data per second. 
Every FTP request had a server overhead of IE-06 seconds.
The third 100 megabit link connects the Ethernet Switch to the access point, called 
the WLAN NAP, which is located inside the Campus Network subnet. In Figure 4-3, this 
link is depicted as the link between Ethernet Switch and Campus Network. WLAN NAP 
controls the wLAN inside of this subnet. The Ethernet network is significantly faster than 
the IEEE 802.11 network. To eliminate throughput constraints and to minimize delay nec­
essary to estimate the real performance of the wLAN. The Application Config object de­
fines the application behavior which generates the simulation’s network traffic. The object 
denoted as Profile Config governs which FTP server each of the wireless stations attempt to 
establish an FTP session with.
In the interest of simplifying the simulation design and layout, all of the wLAN 
stations and the access point were placed into the Campus Network s.Aret. Inside of this 
subnet are five wireless stations, all of which are presented in Figure 4-4. WLAN Node 1 is 
located on the leftmost edge of the wLAN, and is beyond the radio range of all of the frame 
relaying protocol extension participants except the access point. Since the only relay mes­
sage traffic it will receive originates from the access point, it should be the station least 
affected by the additional network traffic incurred by the protocol extension.
WLAN Node 2 is located within the communication range of both the access point 
and the relay station, but is still out of the communication range of the isolated station. 
Therefore, it should receive the relay message traffic exchanged between the access point 
and the relay station, and the transmissions from the relay station to the isolated station (but 
not messages originating from the isolated station.) Because of this, WLAN Node 2 should 
be more affected by the relayed network session than WLAN Node 1. The placement of 
WLAN Node 3 is such that it receives all of the relayed message traffic that WLAN Node 2 
receives, in addition to the traffic originating from the isolated station. Therefore, it should
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be the station that is most affected by the use of the frame relaying protocol extension that is 
not involved in the relayed network session.
The wireless station, called the WLAN Node 4, is the designated relay station in the 
simulation model. Although the protocol extension as defined in Chapter 2 states that the 
RFS message is broadcasted for all potential relay stations to receive, the simulation was 
designed to unicast the RFS message to a predetermined set station. This ensures that the 
same relay station is selected among multiple iterations of the simulation. The effect of the 
protocol extension should be the greatest among the non-isolated stations, since it is respon­
sible for relaying frames between the access point and the isolated station in addition to its 
own network access demands.
The final object, called the Isolated Station, is the wireless station which may or 
may not be able to communicate with WLAN NAP, depending on the configuration of the 
maximum radio range in the simulation. If it is unable to directly communicate with the 
access point, it then attempts a relayed network session with WLAN NAP through WLAN 
Node 4. It is the only station which interacts with the Si FTP Server; all of the other stations 
communicate with FTP Server.
Every station has its wLAN physical characteristics set to the following specifica­
tions:
• The wLAN’s data rate is 5.5 megabits per second.
• The Physical Layer is set to use Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum.
• Both RTS/CTS and Fragmentation are disabled.
• Fragmentation Threshold is set to 0 bytes (no fragmentation.)
• Only WLAN NAP is configured for access point functionality.
'  Radio range is either 100 meters or 300 meters. The protocol extension is neces­
sary only when the radio range is set to 100 meters. The circles drawn in Figure 4-4 depict
57
58
Figure 4-4: Layout diagram of the Campus Network Wireless LAN
the 100 meter radio range of WLAN NAP, WLAN Node 4. and the Isolated Station, respec­
tively.
• Assume negligible propagation delays.
• Each station had a statically assigned MAC Address. Table 4-1 provides a list of 
the values assigned to each station.
The WLAN NAP, WLAN NODE 4, and Isolated Station objects required additional 
configuration, specifically in the Wireless MAC Relaying Parameters subsection, in order 
to use the frame relaying protocol extension:
• All three of these stations must have the field MAC Frame Relaying set to enabled, 
otherwise the protocol extension will remain deactivated even in situations where it is the 
only option for a station to establish a network connection with the access point.
• On the Isolated Station, the Maximum Relayed Frames Before Forcing RFI is set 
to five. This limits the number of relay descriptors a RFI message may carry. Once five relay 
data messages have been transmitted, a RFI message is automatically generated and trans­
mitted immediately afterwards.
Table 4-1: MAC addresses of wireless LAN stations.
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Station M A C  A d d ress
W L A N  N A P 65
W L A N  N O D E  1 1
W L A N  N O D E  2 2
W L A N  N O D E  3 3
W L A N  N O D E  4 4
Iso la ted  S ta t ion 8
• The Target Sxi Node for the Isolated Station is set to 4, the MAC Address of 
WLAN NODE 4. WLAN NODE 4 will serve as the relay station in simulations requiring 
the use of the protocol extension. The current implementation of the protocol extension in 
OPNET does not support the broadcasting of RFS messages.
Ten simulations were executed under this simulation configuration. The first five 
were configured with a radio range of 300 meters, and each had a unique seed value initial­
izing the simulation. The remaining five simulations were configured to match the first five 
simulations’ seed values, and the radio range was collapsed to 100 meters. This would 
force the Isolated Station to require the protocol extension in order to maintain network 
connectivity. The results of these simulations are discussed in Chapter 5.
In these ten simulations, it is likely that relayed data packets would collide with 
packets originating from the other stations associated with the wLAN. This would result in 
retransmissions and therefore a reduction in throughput and an increase in delay. To exam­
ine the performance of the protocol extension in an environment less prone to packet re­
transmissions, two of the simulations (one and six, to examine both relayed and non-relayed 
scenarios) were re-executed. In both of these two simulations, IEEE 802.1 l ’s RTS/CTS 
mechanism was enabled and invoked with any data packet with a payload over 255 octets. 




The successful completion of the battery of simulations proves that the Frame Re­
laying Protocol Extension successfully increased the coverage area of an IEEE 802.11- 
based wireless LAN. This ensured that an isolated station that is within radio range of one 
of the wLAN’s member stations can still access the network through a relayed network 
session. This is evident in the simulations when the radio range was collapsed from 300 to 
100 meters, as the Isolated Station is still able to establish contact and exchange data with 
the Si FTP Server through the use of the protocol extension.
It was expected that the use of the protocol extension would decrease overall net­
work throughput, and that the isolated station would likewise suffer a decrease in through­
put and an increase in end-to-end delay. Although the wireless LAN as a whole entity 
experienced a moderate loss of throughput, the throughput and delay penalties incurred on 
the isolated station was much more than expected.
The results of the simulation are examined in the following order:
1) Overall Network Throughput Performance. In this section, the aggregate through­
put for ever}' station that is part of the wLAN is examined. By analyzing the global through­
put, gains and losses for every station are pooled together so that the overall gain/loss may 
be analyzed. The global relayed throughput represents the total throughput of data passed 
along through the protocol extension at the endpoints of the relayed network session.
2) Effects of the Protocol Extension on Delay. This section focuses on the overall 
delay experienced by all of the wireless stations. This permits analysis of the widespread
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effects that the protocol extension has on delay. The global delay for relayed packets is also 
analyzed to study the delay experienced by relayed data.
3) Effects of the Protocol Extension on Si’s Traffic. This section concentrates on the 
differences in the performances experienced by the isolated station when it must relay on 
the frame relay protocol extension in order to establish a network session.
4) Effects of the Protocol Extension on the WLAN NAP. In this section, the effects 
of the protocol extension on the access point are explored. This station is of particular 
importance since all data exchanged between the wireless stations and their respective FTP 
servers must pass through this station.
5) Effects of the Protocol Extension on the Relay Station (Node 4). This section 
studies the effects of the protocol extension on a station that volunteered to serve as a relay 
station.
6) Effects of the Protocol Extension on Nodes 1 through 3’s Traffic. In this section, 
the effects of the protocol extension on uninvolved stations are explored. Each station, 
differing from one another only in their proximity to the relay station and the isolated sta­
tion, is analyzed to examine how the use of the protocol extension affects other stations.
7) Effects of RTS/CTS on the Protocol Extension. Two separate simulations were 
performed with the RTS/CTS option enabled to study the effects of the media-access con­
tention management mechanism that is a part of IEEE 802.11. Without RTS/CTS, any lost 
packets due to collisions have to be retransmitted. This may be expensive in terms of net­
work bandwidth when large frames have to be retransmitted multiple times, especially when 
relayed packets have an unlimited number of retry attempts.
In this chapter, the simulation scenario types are presented in two separate classifi­
cations: non-frame-relayed scenarios and frame-relayed scenarios. The first five simula­
tions fall under the former classification. In these simulations, the coverage area of the 
wLAN was 300 feet, which was sufficient to reach all of the wireless stations. For the latter
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classification, the coverage area was collapsed to 100 meters, to force the Isolated Station to 
depend on the frame relay protocol extension in order to communicate with the wireless 
network and the Si FTP Server. Therefore in the sixth through tenth simulations, the proto­
col extension was invoked.
In the figures that follow, the statistics gathered from the first simulation were used 
to plot the various results for the non-frame-relayed scenarios. The results between the first 
through fifth simulations were very similar to one another, despite varying seed values. 
Since a method to derive a graph from the average of several simulations was unavailable in 
OPNET, the results of the first simulation run were chosen to illustrate the non-frame-re- 
layed scenario. Likewise, the statistics gathered from the sixth simulation (whose seed 
value is identical to the first simulation) were used to plot the various graph results for the 
frame-relayed scenario. This is acceptable since the results between the sixth through the 
tenth simulations, which required the use of the protocol extension, were similar to one 
another.
Many of the graphs were generated with the Average filter. This operation smoothed 
much of the burstyness out of the graph for ease of understanding. Graphs generated with 
the Adder filter were not smoothed since OPNET does not support the application of mul­
tiple filters in graph generation.
Although the graphs only display the results of simulations one and six, the sample 
mean and standard deviation of the various statistics studied for all of the simulations are 
provided. Cross-simulation sample means and standard deviations are generated from these 
values to illustrate the overall performance of the wireless network and the protocol exten­
sion.
Overall Network Throughput Performance
In OPNET, throughput is defined as the amount of data received by a station that is 
passed to the upper layers of its network stack (including data which is to be routed onto a
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distribution system.) This allows the true performance of the network to be analyzed, as it 
provides information about how the upper layers (such as applications) perceive the net­
work performance. It does not include data arriving from duplicate packets, control mes­
sages, relay message data which passes through the relay station, or data from frames which 
are not targeted specifically for the receiver. Since it is the data stream passed up to the 
higher layers, it is only measured in bits per second.
The overall (global) network throughput performance, taking into consideration all 
of the participating wireless workstations, took a modest performance when a relayed net­
work session between Isolated Station and WLAN NAP was established. Refer to Table 5- 
1 for the sample mean throughput for each simulation and the calculated cross-simulation 
sample mean for the vvLANs that did not use the protocol extension and those that did.
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Table 5-1: Global throughput for the wLAN in bits/sec. (a) Without invoking the protocol 
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
SarapJ* Mean • Standard DerfeatloB
bite/sec biis/sec
Smibtbt) 6 3.607.727 302,160
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(a) (b)
In the non-frame-relayed scenario, the average throughput in the wLAN was ap­
proximately 3,966 kilobits per second (kbps). This dropped to an average of 3,531 kbps in 
the frame-relayed scenario, a loss of approximately 12%. Figure 5-1(a) depicts a history of 
global throughput between the two simulation runs.
In the frame-relayed scenario, very little relayed data contributed to the wLAN’s 
global throughput. While the average throughput of the wLAN was approximately 3,531 
kbps, only 43 kbps of that was contributed by relayed data traffic (about one percent.) The
rest of the global throughput was generated by the network traffic from WLAN Nodes 1 
through 4. The graph in Figure 5-1(b) shows the vast difference between the total wLAN 
throughput and its relayed throughput component. The sample means and standard devia­
tions for relayed throughput are given in Table 5-2.
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Figure 5-1: wLAN average global throughput performance in bits/sec. (a) Comparison of 
throughput with and without the use of the protocol extension, (b) Comparison of total 
throughput and relayed throughput.
Table 5-2: Global relayed throughput in bits/sec for the frame-relay scenario.
1 . Sample M m i Seanrfard Deviation
1! ,618
« * * * » * ' •  ^  52.317 87,323
S t a W D B * ' - ^  39,531 24.289
S ro b *m 9  •• - 47.R83 31.495
SrafcsbnlO  . 48.321 51.945
S o n **  M « r  43,789 41,334
Effects of the Protocol Extension on Delay 
OPNET defines Delay as the amount of time, in seconds, that it takes for a data-link 
level packet to reach its destination. Delay is affected by both the distance of propagation, 
backoffs waiting for the wireless media tc become available, and retransmissions resulting 
from packet collisions. For relayed messages, delay is measured as the amount of time it
takes for a data packet to propagate from its station of origin to the relay station, and from 
the relay station to its final destination. Relayed messages can expect significantly longer 
delays than non-relayed messages, because:
♦ The data carried by relayed messages must be transmitted twice (once to the relay 
station, and once more to the final destination). Therefore, a single message has to wait 
twice for transmission opportunities, which is likely to result in a longer delay as a result of 
increased probabilities for frame collisions.
• The busyness of the relay station may significantly slow down its ability to process 
relayed messages. In this study, CPU load was not made a contributing factor to delay on 
the part of the relay station.
• When an RDFO data message arrives at the relay station (the only type supported 
by the current model implementation of the relayed frame protocol extension), it must wait 
for an RFI frame to arrive before it is transmitted to its final destination. Messages that 
arrive earlier therefore experience a longer delay than messages that arrive later. The larger 
the values assigned to Force RFI Timer or Max Outgoing Relay Queue length, the longer 
the potential delay.
* The “Backoff Penalty”, due to extreme delay resulting from the increasing backoff 
timer with every failed retransmission attempt, and an unlimited number of retransmission 
attempts for relay messages. Normally IEEE 802.11 discards packets which are retransmit­
ted too many times to reduce delay, leaving the responsibility of handling the packet loss to 
the end station’s upper network layers. Since the protocol extension requires that all RDFO 
messages described in an RFI message to have been successfully received ahead of itself, 
relayed packets cannot be discarded. Even though IEEE 802.11 limits the maximum backoff 
period per retransmission attempt with a constant aCWmax, by not eventually discarding 
the packet (which would reset the backoff timer), other non-relayed packets which are likely
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to have much shorter backoff periods have an advantage in gaining access to the transmis­
sion media.
For example, a relayed packet may experience several retransmissions during a pe­
riod of intense network activity, quickly maximizing the backoff timer to aCWmax. After 
the period of intense network traffic has subsided, the relayed frame may still wait unrea­
sonably long periods of time before attempting to retransmit, while other packets have much 
smaller backoff due to packet discards (and thus backoff timer resets.)
Table 5-3 presents the average delays for non-relayed packets observed in all of the 
simulation runs. Three graphs displaying the delay observed in the non-frame-relayed and 
frame-relayed scenarios are available in Figure 5-2. Figure 5-2(a) illustrates the delay expe­
rienced by packets in the non-frame-relayed scenario, where delay was observed at an aver­
age of 0.57 seconds per packet. Figure 5-2(b) presents the average delay experienced by 
non-relayed packets in the frame-relayed scenario. In both simulations, delay increased 
linearly with time. In contrast to the first simulation, however, the slope of the graph in the 
second simulation is much more shallow, with delay averaging at 0.18 seconds per packet.
In Figure 5-2(c) and Table 5-4, the delays experienced by relayed messages in the 
frame-relayed scenarios are displayed. As expected, the delay experienced by relayed mes­
sages is significantly longer than those experienced by non-relayed message, averaging 
5.62 seconds per packet.
Ethernet Link Throughput
In Figure 4-3, there are three Ethernet links which interconnect the devices in the 
wired infrastructure: Campus LAN (the wLAN) to the Ethernet Switch, FTP Server to the 
Ethernet Switch, and the Si FTP Server to the Ethernet Switch. Statistics on the traffic 
passing across each link were monitored to gain a better understanding of the distribution of 
network resources by separating the Isolated Station’s activity from the activities that be­
long to the remaining wireless stations.
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Table 5-3: Global delay wLAN in seconds, (a) Without invoking the protocol extension, 
(b) Invoking the protocol extension (does not include relayed packets.)
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Semple Mean Standard Deviation
seconds accond*
Sintjktiwi6 0.20 0.07
S emit ticm 7 0.20 0.08
SpnJatioti8 0.17 0.07
Sirruk&n 9 0.14 0.05
SknAttbii JO 0.19 0.04
Staple Me to 0.18 0.06
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Kconrfi •ecotrfs
S imitation 1 0.67 0.35
Simifatiw 2 0.57 0.25
b t tV B x n n  3
.....  .............
0.54 0.26
SsT»jbfk?n4 , 0.44 0.24
Ssnubtbn 5 0.63 0.33
S tm ^ t M e tn 0.57 0.?'*
(a) (b)
Table 5-4: Global relayed frame delay in seconds for wLAN when invoking the protocol 
extension (considers only relayed packets.)
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Figure 5-2: Average packet delay in seconds, (a) Average delay per packet in a wLAN in the 
non-frame-relayed scenario, (b) Average delay per packet in a wLAN in the frame-relayed 
scenario, (c) Average delay per packet experienced by relayed messages in the frame- 
relayed scenario.
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The performance loss experienced by the Isolated Station in the frame-relayed sce­
nario is quite apparent in the graphs in Figures 5-3. 5-4. and 5-5. Statistical averages 
extracted from all of the simulations are available in Tables 5-5 and 5-6. Overall throughput 
(combining data transported in both directions) between the end stations dropped from an 
average of 595 kbps (86.5 paekets/sec) to 50 kbps (8.39 packets/sec), nearly twelve times 
slower.
Data from the Isolated Station destined for the Si FTP Server were transported through 
the link at the rate of 494 kbps (49.03 packets/sec) in the non-frame-relayed scenario, and at 
a rate of 30 kbps (4.27 packets/sec) in the frame-relayed scenario. Conversely, data origi­
nating from the Si FTP Server en route to the Isolated Station passed through the link at a 
rate of 101 kbps (37.47 packets/sec) in the non-frame-relayed scenario, and at a rate of 20 
kbps (4.12 packets/sec) in the frame-relayed scenario.
Table 5-5: Average throughput in bits/sec and packets/sec for data originating from the Si 
FTP Server, (a) Without the wLAN invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the 
protocol extension.
Sample Mrao Staaianf Deviation
bfa/SBC p K k s & a e c bits/soc packets/scc
Simulation 6 I!.904 2.95 .,.692 1.03
Sic»toson7 26.414 4.84 54.830 6.72
Sia»d«30o8 ! 4.893 3.59 9.692 1.78
SraM on? 24.857 4.63 21.023 2.74
S jr*& n 1 0 25.064 4.59 38,759 4.33
CrottvSiriAsfen
Sm VN fem
20.626 4.! 7. 25.999 3.32
SMtpte Mesa Standard Deviation
•btetoc ptcfcete/aec bits/sec • packets/sec
S ira h tiw l . 112.027 42.97 129.876 9.81
Stas>feo2.. 89,977 36.66 51,811 8.08
SirotefcnJ 103,636 33.84 89,819 9.82
Sjndctiool 136,874 42.47 82.186 8.93
SnuWc-i? 66,174 31.45 47,936 5.50
SorpteMM,
101.737 37.47 80.925 8.42
(a) (b)
Table 5-6: Average throughput in bits/sec and packets/sec destined to the Si FTP Server, (a) 
Without the wLAN invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
bhs/aec p a c k e d bits/sec packets/sec
Simulation 1 562.660 56.14 163.692 12.04
Simulation 2 '■ 502.425 49.19 "s,3!3 11.14
Ssrubtion 3 422.325 42.72 156,811 13.36
Simulation 4 543,865 54.53 163.917 13.74
Simulation 5 438.903 42.57 106.838 8.91
Cross-Simulation 
Sample Mean
494.035 49.03 141.294 11.84
SamplaMw* Stais&nlDeYfeitton'
Ma/sec ‘ pecVets/'sec bift'eec packets/sec .
jSji 23.922 3.23 9.271 1.17
Simulation 7 34.067 4.83 39.674 6.00
Sanitation 8 29.998 4.00 16.717 2.16
.Simulation 9 31.384 4.69 14.689 2.49
Simulation 10 31.816 4.60 17.831 3.43




Figure 5-3: Total bi-directional throughput between Ethernet Switch and Si FTP Server, 
(a) Total throughput in bits/sec. (b) Total throughput in packets/sec.
Figure 5-4: Average throughput from Si FTP Server to Ethernet Switch, (a) Average through­
put in bits/sec. (b) Average throughput in packets/sec.
i — ..'x ........x ;e i
(a )  (b)
F ig u r e  5 -5 : A v e ra g e  th r o u g h p u t  f ro m  E th e r n e t  S w itc h  to  S i F T P  Server, (a )  A v e ra g e  th r o u g h ­
p u t  in  b i t s / s e c .  (b )  A v e r a g e  th r o u g h p u t  in  p a c k e ts / s e c .
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Overall throughput for the remaining wireless stations actually slightly improved 
when the protocol extension was invoked, as shown in Figure 5-6 and in Tables 5-7 and 5-8. 
Average throughput rose from 3,586 kbps (479.37 packets/sec) to 3,766 kbps (528.16 pack- 
ets/sec), an increase of approximately five percent. This indicates that the Wireless Nodes 1 
through 4 had taken advantage of the Isolated Station’s diminished media-access efficiency. 
The “Backoff Penalty" discussed in the Delay section is likely at least partially responsible 
for this small increase in throughput for non-relayed traffic. It should be noted, however, 
that even though non-relayed traffic enjoys a marginal increase in throughput, the loss of 
throughput experienced by the Isolated Station when it is dependant on the protocol exten­
sion is enough to significant to diminish overall network performance.
Figures 5-7 and 5-8 present graphs of both data throughput targeted to the FTP 
Server, and originating from the FTP Server respectively. All of the additional throughput
Table 5-7: Average throughput originating from the FTP Server in bits/sec and packets/sec. 
(a) Without the wLAN invoking the protocol extension, (b) With the wLAN invoking the 
protocol extension. ____________________________________
Santpie Mem Standard Devtatioa
bits/sec packets/sec bte.'KC packeotoc
SimuiatioB 6 616.399 216.43 231.752 19.32
S ta*tbn7 588.848 213.02 191.530 25.65
SrmMon8 753.614 221.26 319.544 18.23
SmiaionS 801.898 221.38 286.952 21.09
SsndttimlO 578.157 214.39 126.336 23.09
Cross-Sant&tbn. 
SmtjpIb Mean
667.783 217.29 231.224 21.47





SbciKim 1 265.211 18' .87 281.973 20.76
Sinibtjon2 ; 266.287 186.24 262.441 19.81
Smdation 3 273.896 191.24 280.698 19.73
291,235 184.05 1S9.741 19.47
S isolation 5 277.391 192.91 209.214 16.71
Cr, s--SrnuhFon 
Sasple Mean
27-J.804 187.26 244.813 19.29
(a) (b)
Table 5-8: Average throughput destined to the FTP Server in bits/sec and packets/sec. (a) 
Without the wLAN invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Senate Mean Standard Deviation
bits/sec packets/sec bks/sec packets/sec
SimJatim 6 3.172.888 315.75 408.410 30.41
Sm&tion 7 . . 3.085.679 310.81 525.872 44.49
Simulation 8 2.940.423 307.62 521.144 35.74
Simulation 9 2,861,277 304.40 491.365 ! 38.29 
___1
Simulation 10 3.133.950 315.78 392.860 36.06
Cross-Simula tion 
Sample Mean
3.098.843 310.87 467.930 36.99
(a) (b)
noted earlier is shown to originate from the FTP Server, with an increase to 667 kbps (217,29 
packets/sec) during the frame-relay scenario, from 274 kbps (187.26 packels/sec) in the 
non-frame-relayed scenario. Throughput traversing the Ethernet link in the other direction 
decreased from 3,331 kbps kbps (292.11 packets/sec) to 3,098 kbps (310.87 packets/sec).
The link between the Campus Network and the Ethernet Switch is an excellent test 
point to examine how efficiently the network is operating, since traffic from all of the FTP 
servers and the wireless stations must cross through this link. As expected, the graph in
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Figure 5-6: Total bi-directional throughput between Ethernet Switch and FTP Server, 
(a) Total throughput in bits/sec. (b) Total throughput in packets/sec.
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Figure 5-7: Average throughput from FTP Server to Ethernet Switch, (a) Average through­
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Figure 5-8: Average throughput from Ethernet Switch to FTP Server, (a) Average through­
put in bits/sec. (b) Average throughput in packets/sec.
Figure 5-9(a), which plots the total throughput propagating through the link, appears simi­
lar to the vvLAN global throughput graph in Figure 5-1(a), with overall throughput lower in 
the frame-relayed scenario than the non-frame-relayed scenario. Overall link throughput 
decreased from. 4,184 kbps (565.89 packets/sec) to 3,757 kbps (539.59 packets/sec), a loss 
of approximately ten percent.
Tables 5-9 and 5-10 provide a breakdown of the throughput in both directions for 
each simulation, along with a cross-simulation average for simulations which used the pro­
tocol extension and those which did not. Figures 5-10 and 5-11 plots a history of through­
put originating from and destined to the Campus Network, respectively. Data originated 
from the Campus Network at an average rate of 3,805 kbps (315.14 packets/sec) in the non­
frame-relayed scenario, and 3,096 kbps (315.14 packets/sec) in the frame-relayed scenario. 
Traffic heading to the Campus Network was recorded to arrive at an average rate of 376 
kbps (224."4 packets/sec) and 688 kbps (221.45 packet/sec) respectively.
Effects of the Protocol Extension on the Isolated Station
In the simulation, the protocol extension fulfills its task of enabling the Isolated 
Station to establish a network session with the wLAN outside of the access point’s coverage 
area. This is verified by both debug information generated during simulation execution and
Table 5-9: Average throughput originating from the Campus Network in bits/sec and pack- 
ets/sec. (a) Without the wLAN invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol 
extension.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
bia'soc packets/sec bitt/rec packets/sec
Simulation 6 3.196.829 318.99 408.229 30.48
SinxtJation 7 3.119.757 315.64 501.372 40.78
Simulation 8 2.970.454 311.62 511.807 34.49
Simulation 9 2.892.676 309.09 487.890 37.71
Sinulatiori 10 3.165.797 320.38 386.098 34.82
Cross-Simla tion 
Sample Mean
3.069.102 315.14 459.079 35.65
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
bits/sec packets/sec bits/sec pockcts'sec
Simulation 1 3.789.300 341.17 500,512 27.01
Simulation 2 3.819.605 341.58 475.972 31.49
Smifctkm 3 3.803.292 340.51 453.085 27.64
Simulation 4 3.768.208 338.95 461.628 32.80
Simulation 5 3.845.790 343.56 355.374 23.07
Cross-Simulation 
Sample Mean
3.805.239 341.15 449,314 28.40
(a) (b)
Table 5-10: Average throughput destined to the Campus Network in bits/sec and packets/ 
sec. (a) Without the wLAN invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol 
extension.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
bits/sec p3ckets/sec bks/sec packets/sec
Simulation 6 628.302 219.39 231.084 19.53
Simulation 7 615.262 218.05 207.826 23.02
Simulation 8 768.506 224.86 321.456 17.78
Snufadon 9 826.754 226.01 297,194 21.48
S ta tio n  10 603.220 218.98 137.968 22.05
Cross-Szmhtion 
Sample Mean
688.408 221.45 239.105 20.77
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
bits/scc pockcts/se e - bits/scc packets/scc
Smiktxm 1 377.238 224.85 403.308 23.52
Smifct»n2
. .. • -
356.263 222.90 295.984 19.75
377.532 225.09 319.301 20.22
I 428.109 226.53 262.608 21.05
343.564 224.36 226.131 14.80
376.541 224.74 301.446 19.86
(a) (b)
Figure 5-9: Total bi-directional throughput between Ethernet Switch and Campus Network, 
(a) Total throughput in bits/sec. (b) Total throughput in packets/sec.
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Figure 5-10: Average throughput from Campus Network to Ethernet Switch, (a) Average 
throughput in bits/sec. (b) Average throughput in packets/sec.
Figure 5-11: Average throughput from Ethernet Switch to Campus Network, (a) Average 
throughput in bits/sec. (b) Average throughout in packets/sec.
with the fact that in the simulations running the frame-relayed scenario, even though the 
Isolated Station is outside of the WLAN NAP’s coverage area, it is still able to exchange 
data with the Si FTP Server.
As expected from the previous observations, the throughput in a relayed network 
session is less than the throughput ;n a normal network session, as shown in Table 5-11 and 
Figure 5-12. According to the simulation results, the impact was an average decrease of 
61,267 bits per second were passed up to the Isolated Station's upper layers. The average
Table 5-11: Isolated Station’s throughput in bits/sec. (a) Without invoking the protocol 
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
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Sam ple M e a n S ta n d ard  D eviation
bits/scc bits/scc
Simulation 6 7,658 3.866
Sknukttbn 7 19,323 52,632
Simuiofion 8 10.408 9.132
S initiation 9 17,541 19.397
Simulation 10 17,525 37.752
Sam ple M e a n 14.491 24.558
S am ple M e a n S ta n d a rd  D ev ia tion
bits/s©C bifciAcc
S itu a tio n  1 86,832 125.646
Simulation 2 64,608 51,281
Sm itetion 3 77,546 87,761
Simulation 4 103,454 81,752
Simulation 5 46.350 48,357
Sam ple M e a n 75,758 78,959
(a) (b)
Figure 5-12: Isolated Station’s throughput in bits/sec.
throughput during a normal network connection was 75 kbps, and 14 kbps when the proto­
col extension was activated.
The delay experienced by packets carrying the data measured in the throughput 
measurement was very high during the start of the simulation for the frame-relayed sce­
nario. It quickly leveled out to an average of 1.07 seconds per packet. The long delay in the 
start of the simulation may be indicative of the delay experienced by the first several packets 
arriving from the Isolated Station’s upper layers while its MAC layer was negotiating a 
relayed network session with Wireless Node 4 and WLAN NAP. Once the session was 
established, the delay leveled out as seen in Figure 5-13. Delay for the Isolated Station in 
the non-frame-relayed scenario started very low in the beginning of the simulation, and
steadily increased with time. It eventually exceeded the delay associated with the activation 
of the protocol extension at approximately 40 minutes into the simulation, averaging 1.48 
seconds per packet. The average delays for each simulation is available in Table 5-12.
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Table 5-12: Isolated Station’s delay in seconds, (a) Without invoking the protocol exten
sion. (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Seconds Seconds
S n u k tb n l 1.75 0.95
Sinitaion2 1.49 0.68
Simulation 3 1.41 0.71
Smihtion 4 1.14 0.64
Smifetbn5 1.63 0.89
SomrJo Moan 1.48 0.77
(a)
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Seconds Seconds
Simulation 6 1.17 0.44
Smilatbn 7 1.00 0.50
Simulation S 1.11 0.44
Simulation 9 1.00 0.56
SirruSation 10 1.10 0.25
Sample Mean 1.07 0.43
(b)
Figure 5-13: Isolated Station’s delay in seconds.
Recall that throughput, as defined by OPNET, does not include control messages, 
including relay control messages such as the connection-setup and RFI messages. The 
transmission of these messages would consume more bandwidth than indicated by the 
throughput measurements. Table 5-13 presents the average rate of data exchanged between 
the Isolated Station and its relay station from the Isolated Station’s perspective. Figure 5-14 
illustrates this data exchange in graphs denoted in bits/sec and packets/sec. Relayed data
arrived at the Isolated station at an average of 15 kbps (4.32 packets/sec); comparing this 
with the throughput in Table 5-11, an average of 1.241 bits/sec of the incoming data stream 
was consumed by RFI messages. The Isolated Station transmitted relayed data to its relay 
station. Wireless Node 4, at a rate of 35 kbps (5.14 packets/sec).
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Table 5-13: Isolated Station’s bi-directional relay traffic in bits/sec and packets/sec. (a) 
Transmitted to the Isolated Station, (b) Transmitted from the Isolated Station.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
bits/sec packcWsec bils/soc packets'sec
Simulation 6 27.812 3.90 11.167 1.37
Simulation 7 39.576 5.82 45.615 7.18
Simulation 8 35.001 4.82 19.788 2.59
Simulation 9 36.388 5.65 17.248 2.94
Simulation 10 37.032 5.54 20.713 4.10
Cross- Simulation 
Sample Mean
35.161 5.14 22.906 3.63
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
bits/sec pnckets/sec bits/sec pnckcii/sec
Smdatfcm6 8.561 3.11 4,093 1.08
SmCation 7 20.782 5.10 54.836 8.04
Saratiation 8 11.527 3.88 9.686 2.10
Sta*tfcn9 18,914 4.81 20,257 3.15
Sinafctbn 10 18,875 4.73 39.181 5.15
Cross-Ssrjuhtion
S'R'pkMon-;
15,732 4.32 25.610 3.90
(a) (b)
Figure 5-14: Isolated Station’s relay traffic, (a) In bits/sec. (b) In packets/sec.
While no packets were discarded during non-frame-relayed scenario, there was an 
average of 0.61 packets per second discarded in the frame-relayed scenario, even though the 
protocol extension did not limit the number of times a relayed packet may retransmit. The 
Dropped Data Packets statistic in OPNET reflects packets discarded due to too many failed 
retransmissions, and packets discarded by the function wlan_higher_layer_data_arrival
when the higher layer buffer has been filled to capacity. This indicates that the higher 
network layers are passing down more packets than the modified IEEE 802.11 MAC layer 
can transmit. Table 5-14 presents the average number of packets discarded by the Isolated 
Station, and Figure 5-15 displays a graph of its packet discard history.
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Table 5-14: Isolated Station’s dropped packets in packets/sec. (a) Without invoking the 
protocol extension, (b) With invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean Standard' Deviation
Packets Packets
Simula tkm 6 0.52 0.32
Simulation 7 0.71 0.34
Simulation 8 0.05 0.36
Simulation 9 0.62 0.39
Simulation 10 0.57 0.41
Sample Mean 0.61 0.36
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Packets Packets
0.0 0.0
Smihtkm 2 0.0 0.0
Ssmfctbi.3 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
“ ” 3. : .
0.0 0.0
* * + ■ # * * 0.0 0.0
(a) (b)
Figure 5-15: Isolated Station’s dropped packets in packets/sec.
The Hid Queue Size statistic, which measures the size of the queue which holds 
packets that arrive from the higher network layers, gathered by OPNET supports this hy­
pothesis. As indicated on Table 5-15, the higher layer buffer held an average of 0.40 packets 
for the non-frame-relayed scenario, indicating that packets arriving from the upper layers 
did not wait long in the queue before they were transmitted across the physical media. On
the other hand, in the frame-relayed scenario, OPNET reported an average of 35.81 packets 
in the higher layer buffer that were waiting for transmission. Figure 5-16 indicates that the 
queue filled rapidly and then leveled out, indicating that the queue was full for nearly all of 
the time during the simulation. A comparison of Figure 5-15 and 5-16 suggests this rela­
tionship as the packet discard rate increased sharply as the buffer filled.
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Table 5-15: Isolated Station’s Hid queue size in packets, (a) Without invoking the protocol 
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sim plr M»«n Standard Deviation
M i Packets Packets
S ta ta b n l 0.48 0.15
0.41 0.12
S in ^ U » 3 0.34 0.14
S in f c f e * 0.48 0.15
Sin»hlk>n5 0.35 0.09
S .OTf e M . .n 0.40 0.13
(a)
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Packets PackoO
Simulation 6 35.12 8.43
v Vinxdatbn 7 35.46 7.54
Simulation 8 35.56 7.65
Simulation 9 37.30 9.11
Simulation 10 35.64 8.20
Sample Mean 35.8! 8.18
(b)
Figure 5-16: Isolated Station’s Hid queue size in packets.
Media Access Delay, as defined by OPNET, is the total amount of time a packet that 
was passed down from the upper network layers spends waiting in the higher layer buffer 
and transmission delays resulting from media access contention. In the frame-relayed sce­
nario, the average Media Access Delay increased from 0 seconds to 8.63 seconds. It is
likely that both the filled higher layer buffer and the “backoff penalty” discussed previously 
are responsible for this delay increase. The Media Access Delay statistical averages ob­
tained from all of the OPNET simulations are available on Table 5-16. A graph comparing 
the history of the Media Access Delay between the two scenarios is shown in Figure 5-17.
8 0
Table 5-16: Isolated Station’s media access delay in seconds, (a) Without invoking the 
protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
.Sunolt M«m StantM DavIaHqb
PMkefc PnollMS
Skro&ion 1 o.oo 0.00
SimAmn 2 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
Stauhtimf 0.00 0,00
Smilstion 3 0.00 0.00
1W.« 0.00 0.00
(a) (b)
Figure 5-17: Isolated Station’s media access delay in seconds.
In IEEE 802.11, retransmissions are a natural response to missed acknowledgments, 
normally the result of a frame collision. These retransmissions are measured by OPNET in 
the Retransmission Attempts statistic. As expected, the relayed network session experi­
enced many more retransmissions than a non-relayed network session. The average num­
ber of retransmissions taken by the Isolated Station in a normal network environment aver­
aged 207.12. When the protocol extension was activated, the number of retransmissions 
increased to an average of 1,480.62. These simulation results are available in Table 5-17. A
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history of this statistic for the first and sixth simulations is available on Figure 5-18.
Table 5-17: Isolated Station’s retransmission attempts in number of attempts, (a) Without 
invoking the protocol extension, (b) With invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Attempts Attempts
Simulation (, 1.522.66 357.25
Simulation. 7 1.477.26 293.88
Simulation 8 1.577.10 361.78
Simulation 9 1.478.65 378.42
Simulation 10 1.317.44 265.51
Sample Mean 1.480 62 331.36
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Attempts Attend ft
Slnublion I 232.21 57.99
Sm fctbn 210.35 51.27
S ta ih fc 'i j 180.50 59.59
S tn * tb o 4 230.79 62.61
S ta ih *n  5 181.79 40.45
Simple M e » 207.12 54.38
(a) (b)
Figure 5-18: Isolated Station’s retransmission attempts in number of packets (transmission 
attempts).
Effects of the Protocol Extension, on the WLAN NAP 
Since WLAN NAP is the access point for the entire wLAN, all network traffic must 
pass through it either on the way to the FTP servers or back to the wireless stations. Be­
cause of this, WLAN NAP is the busiest device in the entire wLAN as well as a potential 
bottleneck. It was previously observed that invoking the protocol extension had adverse
effects to the efficiency of the wLAN as a whole, although some stations took advantage of 
the Isolated Station’s diminished throughput capacity. The access point’s performance is 
adversely affected not only by the packet retransmission performed by the relay station, 
WLAN NODE 4, but also by the method of operation which the protocol extension is de­
signed. Like the Isolated Station, relayed packets transmitted to the relay station from WLAN 
NAP must follow the protocol extension's algorithm, including the synchronous exchange 
of relayed messages. Therefore, WLAN NAP suffers from the same “backoff penalty” 
experienced by the Isolated Station. Because the access point is also responsible for pack­
ets arriving to and departing from the access point, this inefficiency adversely affects the 
WLAN NAP’s capacity to serve the rest of the wLAN.
With the WLAN NAP, throughput is data that the access point passes onto the Ethernet 
distribution system; it is never processed by any kind of application executing on the station 
itself. As observed in the previous studies of the effects of the protocol extension on the 
Ethernet links, throughput decreased when the protocol extension was invoked. In the non­
frame-relayed. scenarios, WLAN NAP received an average of 3,733 kbps from stations 
associated with the wLAN. In frame-relayed scenarios, this decreased by 735 kbps to an 
average of 3,001 kbps in the frame-relayed scenarios (refer to Table 5-18 to examine the 
average throughput results between each individual simulation.) Figure 5-19 presents a 
history of throughput through the simulation for both non-frame-relayed and frame-relayed
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Table 5-18: WLA N NAP’s total throughput, m bits/sec and packets/sec. (a) Without mvok 
ing the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample M e a n Standard Deviation
bits/sec bits/sec
Simihtjcn 1- 3.717.620 496.398
Simulation 2 5,747.916 470.46?
Simulation 3 3.731.780 448.597
Simulation 4 3.696,876 455.730
Simulation 5 3.773.711 351.437
Sample Mean 3.733,580 444.562
(a)
S am ple M e s a SLnsdhirdBevktten
■...w.
bits/sec ' bfefec
Shruhticn 5 3.129.002 . . . 403,117
Smdtttrn 7 3.052,652 493.S8S
Simufetion8 2.903.758 505.987
Simulation 9 2.826.353 481.11!
Simulation 10- 3.097.753 379.508
Semple Mean 3,001.903 452.722
(b)
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Figure 5-19: WLAN NAP's throughput in bits/sec, comparing the throughput between the 
non-frame-relayeci scenario and the frame-relayed scenario.
scenarios. These results are comparable to the data rates observed in the Campus Network 
to Ethernet Switch link. The difference of two percent between the wLAN NAP throughput 
and the Ethernet link throughput is likely the result of rounding error in OPNET’s data 
collection. The relayed throughput received by the WLAN NAP in the frame-relayed sce­
nario was calculated to be an average of 29 kbps. This is similar to the rate of data trans­
ported across the Ethernet Switch to Si FTP Server Ethernet link, with a difference of ap­
proximately three percent between the two statistics. Table 5-19 provides the average re­
layed throughput between the frame-relayed scenario simulations. Figure 5-20 historically 
compares non-relayed throughput and relayed throughput in the frame-relayed scenario.
All relayed data messages, including the RFI messages, arrived at the WLAN NAP 
station at a rate of 30 kbps (5.15 packets/sec), as shown in Table 5-20(a). In comparison 
with the renewed relayed throughput, approximately 1,466 bits/sec of this traffic is com­
posed of relay-control data. WLAN NAP transmitted relayed data to WLAN NODE 4 at an 
average rate of 17 kbps (4.32 packets/sec), as shown in Table 5-20(b). Figure 5-21 presents 
a graphical comparison between relayed data transmitted and received by WLAN NAP.
In the non-frame-relayed scenario, the delay for packets received by the WLAN 
NAP station was an average of 0.01 seconds per packet. In frame-relayed scenarios, the 
delay increased to an average of 0.02 seconds per packet. These values do not reflect the
Table 5-19: WLAN NAP’s total relayed throughput in bits/scc.
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S im p le  M e a n S ta n d a rd  D ev ia tion
bfe/scc b is /sec
Sirrutotion 6 23,234 9,020
Simulation 7 32.993 38.438
Simulation 8 29.122 16,325
Sim utatim 9 30,341 14,147
Simulation 10 30.795 17.080
Sam ple M 'enn 29,297 19.002
Figure 5-20: WLAN NAP’s throughput in bits/sec between non-relayed and relayed traffic 
in the frame-relayed scenario.
delay for relayed packets, which experienced substantially longer delays, averaging 9.49 
seconds per packet. The cumulative delay for non-relayed and relayed packets in the frame- 
relayed scenario was estimated at 0.11 seconds per packet. The simulation results on delay 
for both the non-frame-relayed and the frame-relayed scenarios are available on Table 5-21. 
Figure 5-22 compares delay between non-frame-relayed and frame-relayed scenarios, con­
sidering only non-relayed traffic (Figure 5-22(a)) and cumulative non-relayed and relayed 
traffic ( F ig u r e  5-22(b)). Table 5-22 and Figure 5-23 provides information about the delay 
characteristics of relayed frames in frame-relayed scenarios.
A n o th e r  performance f a c to r  that suffered because of the protoco1 extension was the 
number o f  p a c k e t  discards per s e c o n d .  L ik e  the Isolated Station, W L A N  N A P  dropped 
more p a c k e t s  per second after invoking th e  protocol extension, rising from an average of
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Table 5-20: Relayed data in bits/sec and packets/sec. (a) To WLAN NAR (b) From WLAN
NAP.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
btos/soc packcts'gcc bhs/wc packets/sec
S irn5»tion 6 24.354 3.90 9,405 1.40
SmilAtfcin 7 34,648 5.81 40,386 7.20
'• |1.H U in  <1oxntuaoon o 30,501 4.81 17,043 2.61
Sinubtnn 9 31.944 5.64 14,953 2.98
Simulation 10 32.370 5.53 18,169 4.11
Cro«s*SimultttJon 
Sample Mean
30.763 5.13 19,991 3.66
(a )
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
bits/sec packets/sec bits/sec packeU/sec
Sirmlntx>n 6 9.210 3.11 4,716 1.08
Smjiition7 23.092 5.10 63.076 8.04
Simulation 8 12.401 3.88 11.107 2.10
Simulation 9 21.059 4.8! 23.281 3.14
Simulitioti 10 20.813 4.73 45.262 5.16
Cross-Simula tk»n 
Sample Mean
17.315 4.32 29.488 3.90
(b)
(a )
am r c m .t f  M e«lv«4  tp k tf /M C )
 ̂ M l»y«< T iim ttt t i n t  ( f k i t / t t e )
(b)
Figure 5-21: WLAN NAP’s relay traffic, (a) In bits/sec. (b) In packets/sec.
9.0 packets/sec in the non-frame-relayed scenario to an average of 12.1 packets/sec in the 
frame-relayed scenario. The average dropped packets rate for all of the simulations are 
located in Table 5-23. Figure 5-24 presents a comparison of packet discards between the 
non-frame-relayed and the frame-relayed scenario simulations.
Like the Isolated Station, the number of retransmission attempts performed by WLAN 
NAP was nearly tripled when the protocol extension was invoked. This statistic for all of 
the simulations is available on Table 5-24, with a graphical comparison between the non­
frame-relayed and the frame-relayed scenarios on Figure 5-25. In the non-frame-relayed 
scenarios, OPNET reported an average of 649.37 retransmission attempts, this number in­
creased to 1,740.57 in the frame-relayed scenarios.
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Table 5-21: WLAN NAP's delay in seconds, (a) Without invoking the protocol extension.
(a)
Figure 5-22: WLAN NAP’s delay in seconds between non-frame-relayed and frame-re­
layed scenarios, (a) Not including relayed frames in the frame-relayed scenario, (b) Includ­
ing frames in the frame-relayed scenario.
It was expected that the other performance statistics would yield worse performance 
when the protocol extension was activated. Throughput. Delay, and Dropped Packets for 
the WLAN NAP, as well as Retransmission Attempts, all worsened in varying degrees when 
the protocol extension was enabled. However, the remaining performance measurements 
yielded slightly better performance when the protocol extension was enabled, such as the 
Hid Queue Size and Media Access Delay. As shown in Table 5-25 and Figure 5-26, Hid
Queue Size actually decreased. In the non f...me-relayed scenarios, OPNET reported that
the average Hid Queue Size was 318.21 packets. In the frame-relayed scenarios, the queue 
size decreased to 92.66 packets.
( a ) (b)
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Seconds Seconds
Simulation 6 0.01 0 .0 0
Simulation 7 0 .0 2 0 .0 0
Simulation 8 0 .0 2 0 .0 0
Simulation 9 0 .0 2 0 .0 0
Simulation 10 0 .0 2 0 .0 0
Sample Mean 0 .0 2 0 .0 0
(b)
(b) With invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Seconds Seconds
Simulation 1 0.01 0.00
Smdatbn 2 0.01 0.00
Sanitation 3 0.01 0.00
Simulation 4 0.01 0.00
Simulations 0.01 0.00
SnmpJe Mean 0.0! 0.00
1
Likewise, Media Access Delay plummeted from 1.48 seconds per packet in the non­
frame-relayed scenarios down to 0.43 seconds per packet in the frame-relayed scenarios. 
The OPNET results regarding Media Access Delay are available in Tabic 5-26, with Figure 
2-27 comparing the history of Media Access Delay between the two simulation scenarios. 
The improvements to Hid Queue Size and Media Access Delay are likely attributable to the 
Isolated Station’s diminished network-access capabilities.
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Table 5-22: WLAN NAP’s relayed packet delay in seconds.
Sam ple M e a n Standard Deviation
Seconds Seconds
Simulation 6 10.97 5.07
Simulation 7 9.62 4.40
Simulation 8. . 10.02 5.62
Simulation 9 8.27 3.52
Sanitation TO 8.57 4.08
Staatofe Mean 9.49 4.53
Figure 5-23: WLAN NAP’s relayed packet delay in seconds.
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Table 5-23: WLAN N A P’s Dropped Packets in packets/sec. (a) Without invoking the proto­
col extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
packets/sec peekett/tec
S k rd a tb n  6 11.45 3.68
Ssmolatkffi 7 11.66 3.09
Sbutfatiw  8 11.28 4.25
S r a i i t i « i 9 14.18 5.90
Simulation 10 11.94 4.43
Sample M e in 12.30 4.27
Sam ple M e a n S ta n d ard  D ev ia tion
packets/sec packets'sec
8.06 2.23
SmtSation 2 8.53 2.29
8.69 2.94
Simulation 4 10.72 2.89
Sim jlatjon5 9.02
SantpJe M e a n 9.00 2.55
(a) (b)
Figure 5-24: WLAN NAP’s dropped packets in packets/sec.
Table 5-24: WLAN NAP’s retransmission attempts in number of attempts, (a) Without 
invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
S«npfc Mean . StottdjydBevM M i
Packet: Packets
S ta n k * *  6 1.667.87 204.72
S m ih t io n - 1.757.22 229.42
S im * t r a i8 1.749.14 207.29
Simulation 9 1.777.71 | 272.60
Simulation 10. 1,750.95 213.20
Sam ple M e a n 1740.57 225.44
S a n * *  M e a n S ta n d a rd  B ev te tk ro
Packets Packets
Simulatkjn 1 647.33 87,04
Simulation 2 655,03 83.33
Simulation 3 648.58 82.26
Simulation 4 642.38 81.31
Simulation 5 653.54 63.83
Sample Mean 649.37 79..54
(a) (b)
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Figure 5-25: WLAN NAP's retransmission attempts in number of packets (transmission 
attempts.)
Table 5-25: WLAN NAP’s Hid queue size in packets, (a) Without invoking the protocol 
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean S ta n d a rd  D ev ia tion
Packets PsckcB
Simulation 6 103.41 42.49
S n u b tio n  7 105.27 46.31
S m S a n S 85.68 42.38
S m t a b o O 72.30 28.33
S in u f tfe n lO 96.67 25.34
SwEftf* M e a n 92.66 36.97
S am ple  M e a n Standard Deviation
Packets
372.71 197.47
SimSitiM >2 318.42 143.18
302.92 149.02
s k n i i t a - i 246.23 13&.34
S m ila is B S 350.80 188.25
318.21 163.25
(a) (b)
Figure 5-26: WLAN NAP’s Hid queue size in packets.
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Table 5-26: WLAN NA P’s media access uday  in seconds, (a) Without invoking the proto­
col extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Seconds S econdt
Skrwktbo^ 0.49 0.21
Snuttfon 7 0.50 0.22
Sfcrobtipn 8 0.40 0.20
Siinufatbo 9 033 0.13
Sbmbtwn 10 045 0.12
Sample Mean 0.43 0.17
Sam ple M e a n S ta m la rd  D ev ia tion
Seconds Seconds
S i r o M c n l 1.75 0.95
Simulation 2 1.49 0.65
S n u h t i m J 1.41 0.71
S m ifedon 4 1.14 0.65
S m * » K ]  5 1.64 0.89
Singfe Mean 1.48 0.77
(a) (b)
Figure 5-27: WLAN NAP’s media access delay in seconds.
Effects of the Protocol Extension on the Relay Station (WLAN NODE 4)
It was expected that WLAN NODE 4, serving as the relay station in the frame- 
relayed scenario simulations, would experience a universal decrease in performance. This 
is true for the most part, as all except two statistics yielded a light to moderate performance 
loss. Although relayed packets passed along by WLAN NODE 4 were subject to the delays 
and the “backoff penalty” discussed earlier, the small number of relayed packets passing 
through the station limits its effect on the relay station’s performance. The Throughput for 
WLAN NODE 4 increased significantly when the protocol extension was enabled, rising 
from an average of 46 kbps in the non-frame-relayed scenarios, to an average of 159 kbps 
in the frame-relayed scenarios. This increase in data passed to the station’s higher layers is
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Table 5-27: WLAN NODE 4 ’s throughput in bits/sec. (a) Without invoking the protocol
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension (does not include relayed data.)
Sam ple M e a n Standard Deviation
bfctec M v i k
Sfertiktion 6 153,285 109,401
Smthtioft# 129.368 69.103
Simulation 8 168.721 101,189
Skrubtion 9 187.425 93,395
Simulation 10 156.654 87.402
Sam ple M e a n 159.090 92,098
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
b i t t 'K C bits/sec
S in * tb n l 29,510 36,818
Smihtion 2 44.501 62,103
Stm lKbnJ 54,104 93.964
Simubdon 4 54,365 57,472
Simulations 50.520 67.074
Sample M tau 46.600 63,286
(a) (b)
Figure 5-28: WLAN NODE 4’s throughput in bits/sec.
likely the effect of the station taking advantage of the Isolated Station’s diminished network 
access efficiency. Table 5-27 presents the average Throughput for each OFNET simulation 
as well as the calculated averages between the two scenario types. Figure 5-28 presents a 
graph portraying the history of throughput between the non-frame-relaved and frame-re­
layed scenarios.
Delay was the other measurement which reported an improvement when the proto­
col extension was invoked. As shown in Table 5-28 and in Figure 5-29, delay decreased 
from an average of 1.54 seconds per packet in non-frame-relayed scenarios, to 0.44 seconds 
per packet in frame-relayed scenarios.
On average, more packets were dropped when the protocol extension was enabled. 
In the non-frame-relayed scenarios, almost nc packets were discarded; this increased to an
1
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Tabic 5-28: WLAN NODE 4 ’s delay in seconds, (a) Without invoking the protocol exten­
sion. (b) Invoking the protocol extension (does not include relayed data.)
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Second! Second!
Sinikbo-. * 0.50 0.21
0 51 0.22
Sfatitofeert 0 40 0.20
0.34 0.13
Statafoft 10 0.46 0.12
S#»npk Mean 0 44 0.17
Sample Mean Stafford Deviation
Seconds Second*
Shutukifi h 1.75 0.95
S m iM b n ; 1.49 0.68
SmJolix. S 1.41 0.71
SimdMion 9 1.14 0.65
S ta ihdrn iO 1.64 0.89
S a in t* Moan 1.48 0.77
(a) (b)
Figure 5-29: WLAN NODE 4’s delay in seconds.
average of 0.39 packets per second in the frame-relayed scenarios. Table 5-29 provides the 
average number Dropped Packets reported by OPNET. Figure 5-30 presents a history of 
packet discards throughout the simulation of both scenarios.
The Hid Queue Size moderately increased when the protocol extension was en­
abled. Although the size of the queue nearly quadrupled, the average increase was approxi­
mately 1.75 packets, significantly less than that experienced by both the Isolated Station 
and WLAN NAP. As shown in Table 5-30, the average Hid Queue Size increased from 0.68 
packets in non-frame-relayed scenarios, to an average of 2.43 packets in frame-relayed sce­
narios (see Figure 5-31 for a history' of this statistic for both simulation scenarios.)
Media Access Delay increased by a very small amount between the non-frame-re- 
layed and the frame-relayed scenarios. OPNET reported almost no measurable Media Ac-
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Table 5-29: WLAN NODE 4 ’s dropped packets in packets/sec. (a) Without invoking the
protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean Standatd Devlstlen
Seconds Seconds
Stouhtioa C 0.23 0.33
Swfcbtwo 7 0.31 0.46
Sjmktioa 8 0.24 0.39
Sknul»tjoo9 0.71 0.77
Stafctfca 10 0.49 0.49
Sample Mean 0.39 0.48





Simulation 4 0.01 0.06
Sorulfttinn 5 0.00 0.00
Samjrfe Mean 0.00 0.03
(a) (b)
Figure 5-30: WLAN NODE 4’s dropped packets in packets/sec.
cess Delay in the non-frame-relayed scenarios; in the frame-relayed scenarios it increased 
to an average of 0.01 seconds per packet, indicating that in both scenarios, WLAN NODE 4 
did not have a very long wait when attempting to access the wireless media. Table 5-31 
presents the results OPNET gathered regarding Media Access Delay. Figure 5-32 shows a 
history of the Media Access Delay throughout both simulations.
While the number of Discarded Packets, the Hid Queue Size, and the Media Access 
Delay increased in small amounts, the number of retransmissions increased drastically when 
the protocol extension was enabled. In the non-frame-relayed scenarios, OPNET reported 
an average of 292.93 retransmission attempts. In the frame-relayed scenarios, the number 
of retransmission attempts rose to an average of 534.00, an increase of 82%. A history of
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Table 5-30: WLAN NODE 4 ’s Hid queue size in packets, (a) Without invoking the protocol
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sam ple M e a n S ta n d ard  D eviation
Packets Packets
S irm h fb n  6 2 09 0.82
S m ih tb n  7 2.23 1.01
SimufetienS 1.88 1.05
SmiSatiw: 9 3.18 1.32
Simulation 10 2.81 0 85
Sam ple M e a n 2.43 1.01
Sem ple M e a n S ta n d a rd  D e v ia tio n
Packet* Packets
S m d r ic m l 0.65 0.20
S lro h tio n  2 0.84 0.23
Sl" 0.58 0.19
Sfrriilobon 4................ 0.71 0.30
S im ih tio r 5 0.63 0.15
Sam pte M e a n 0.68 0.21
(a) (b)
Figure 5-31: WLAN NODE 4’s Hid queue size in packets.
packet discards between the two scenarios is available in Figure 5-33. The average retrans­
missions for each scenario as reported by OPNET may be found in Table 5-32.
The rate o f  relayed data passing through the relay station has been measured in a 
number of customized statistics. Frames Relayed to Ax (Sxi) measures the amount of data 
which the relay station forwarded to the access point. Frames Relayed to Si (Sxi) measures 
the amount o f  data which the relay station forwarded to all Isolated Stations with which the 
relay station has established a relayed network session. In the configuration denoted in 
Chapter 4, this statistic measures the amount o f  data relayed to the Isolated Station. Relayed 
Frames Received (Sxi) measures the amount o f  relayed data received by the relay station, 
originating f ro m  both the access point and all isolated stations which have a relayed net-
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Tabic 5-31: WLAN NODE 4 ’s media access delay in seconds, (a) Without invoking the
protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sam ple M e a n S ta n d a rd  D ev ia tion
Seconds Seconds
C/
l 1 - 0 .00 0.00
Simulation 2 0.01 0.00
Simulation 3 0 .00 0.00
S h » W w i< 0.00 0.00
Simulation 5 0.00 0.00
M e a n 0.00 0.00
(a) (b)
Figure 5-32: WLAN NODE 4’s media access delay in seconds.
work session established through the relay station. All of these statistics are measured in 
both bits/sec and packets/sec.
In the frame-relayed scenarios, data from the Isolated Station and WLAN NAP (in­
cluding any and all RFI messages) arrived at WLAN NODE 4 at a rate of 46 kbps (9.46 
packets/sec.) Of that incoming data, 30 kbps (5.13 packets/sec) were forwarded to WLAN 
NAP, and the remaining 15 kbps 0.32 packets/sec) were forwarded to the Isolated Station. 
Figure 5-34 provides a history of data arriving at WLAN NODE 4. In Figure 5-35, the 
history of the amount of data forwarded to WLAN NAP and Isolated Station is displayed. 
Tables 5-33 and 5-34 present the averaged results from the OPNET simulations regarding 
incoming and outgoing relay data, respectively.
Table 5-32: WLAN NODE 4’s retransmission attempts in number of attempts, (a) Without 
invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
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S am ple M e a n S ta n d a rd  D ev ia tion
Seconds Seconds
Simulation 1 284.4 71.63
S m ih l im  2 334.34 63.39
S m & fo n  3 265.36 64.84
Simulation 4 292.48 80.72
S a n c t io n  5 288.07 57.04
Sam ple M e a n 292.93 67.52
(a) (b)
Figure 5-33: WLAN NODE 4’s retransmission attempts in number of attempts.
Table 5-33: WLAN NODE 4’s relayed frames received in bits/sec and packets/sec
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Figure 5-34: WLAN N 0D E4’s relayed frames received, (a) In bits/sec. (b) In packets/sec.
Table 5-34: WLAN NODE 4’s relayed frames sent in bits/sec and packets/sec. (a) To WLAN 
NAP. (b) To Isolated Station.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
bks/scc packets/sec bits/sec peckets/sec
Simulation 6 8.561 3.11 4.089 1.08
Simulation 7 20.872 5.10 54.833 8.03
SsniiafiOT? 11.527 3.88 9,866 2.10
Srairion9 18.914 4.81 20.258 3.15
Simulation 10 18.875 4.73 39.184 5.15
Cross-SimiWon 
Sample Mean
15.731 4.32 25,610 3.90
(a) (a)
(a) (b)
Figure 5-35: WLAN NODE 4’s relayed frames sent, (a) In bits/sec. (b) In packets/sec.
€;
Effects of the Protocol Extension on WLAN NODEs 1 through 3’s Traffic
In the OPNET simulation, three wireless stations were not involved in the protocol 
extension operation. All three stations were included in the wLAN to facilitate observation 
of the side effects of the additional overhead incurred by message relaying. One station, 
WLAN NODE 1, was positioned on the opposite side of the WLAN from the Isolated 
Station; the only relayed traffic that it could possibly receive is that which originates from 
WLAN NAP. WLAN NODE 2 is positioned in such a way that it receives relayed traffic 
from WLAN NAP and WLAN NODE 4, but no transmissions from the Isolated Station. 
The last wireless station, WLAN NODE 3. is positioned in such a way that it can receive 
messages from all three participants in the protocol extension. Because certain stations are 
farther away from relayed messaging sources, they experience a lower level of blocking, 
meaning they have less media access contention to deal with.
The effects of the protocol extension on throughput were varied. WLAN NODE 1 
experienced a decrease in throughput from 43 kbps in non-frame-relayed scenarios down to 
37 kbps in frame-relayed scenarios, a loss of nearly 14%. On the other hand, the throughput 
for WLAN NODE 2 increased from 48 kbps in non-frame-relayed scenarios to 173 kbps in 
frame-relayed scenarios, and WLAN NODE 3 likewise increased from 48 kbps to 145 
kbps. The average throughput for each station in all simulations is available in Table 5-35. 
A history of these stations’ throughput performance may be reviewed in Figure 5-36.
Between each station in their respective scenario configurations, Delay was nearly 
uniform. In the non-frame-relayed scenario, the delay averaged at 1.48 seconds per packet 
for WLAN NODE 1 and 2, and 1.49 seconds per packet for WLAN NODE 3. In the frame- 
relayed scenario, delay actually decreased. OPNET reported a delay of 0.43 seconds per 
packet for WLAN NODEs 1 and 2, and 0.44 for WLAN NODE 3. The averages for each 
simulation is available in Table 5-36. A graph for each scenario is displayed in Figure 5-37.
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Tabic 5-35: WLAN NODEs 1-3 throughput in bits/sec. (a) Without invoking the protocol
extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
bit3/*5C biti/eee
Node I Node 2 Node 3 Node 1 Node 2 Node 3
Sxnufa!ion6 25.961 117,589 114.229 29,283 123.950 46,660
Skn)totkm7 24.998 128,592 162.978 19.185 52,084 98,883
Sm&dbn 8 57.435 223.196 155.924 81.192 149.447 95,636
Sirruktion 9 55,101 202.564 178.872 99.938 72.666 87,791
Sirrwlition 10 25.028 136.404 113,028 21.491 44.567 37.389
Sample Mean 37.704 173.669 145,006 50.217 108,542 73.271
Sample Mean Standard Delation
bits/scc btev'sec
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 1 Node 2 Node?
Sinubtbn 1 53.433 44.555 59.652 97,915 59.804 116.594
Simulation 2 46.459 48.116 41.627 68.456 92.423 50.172
Sandaiim? 45.134 44.067 46.070 66.394 65.768 95.865
Sm>hrbn4 37.342 51,547 49.643 25.494 60,242 64.407
Sinubtim 5 36.291 55.769 43.414 27.844 82.089 50.486
Sumpie Mean 43.731 48.810 48.081 57.220 72,065 75,504
(a) (b)
Figure 5-36: WLAN NODEs 1-3 throughput in bits/sec with and without invoking the 
protocol extension, (a) WLAN NODE 1. (b) WLAN NODE 2. (c) WLAN NODE 3.
The most likely cause for this delay uniformity is because the packets with which 
the delay is measured from originated at the WLAN NAP. Since the WLAN NAP is at the 
center of the wLAN (excluding any isolated stations), each of these packets face equal 
network access contention regardless of its destination.
These statistics provide insight on how efficiently data is arriving to the WLAN 
NODE stations from WLAN NAP, but provide little information about the stations’ ability 
to transmit messages. To measure the effect of the protocol extension’s impact on these 
stations’ ability to transmit packets, the Number of Retransmissions each station must pur­
sue to transmit a packet was examined. The results of the simulations regarding the number 
of retransmission attempts may be reviewed in Table 5-37 and in Figure 5-38. WLAN 
NODE 1, the station furthest away from the relaying traffic, experienced an average in-
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Table 5-36: WLAN NODEs 1-3 delay in seconds, (a) Without invoking the protocol exten­
sion. (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Seconds Seconds
Model Node 2 Node 3 Node 1 Node 2 Node 3
Smlation 1 1.75 1.75 1.75 0.95 0.95 0.95
Sirruktion 2 1.49 1.49 1.51 0.68 0.68 0.67
Smihtkm3 1.41 1.41 1.41 0.71 0.71 0.71
SmtlatioD 4 115 114 1.15 0.64 0.65 0.64
Smiktbn 5 1,64 1.64 1.64 0.89 0.89 0.89
Saronic Mean :.48 1.48 1.49 0.77 0.77 0.77
(a) (b)
Figure 5-37: WLAN NODEs 1-3 delay in seconds with and without invoking the protocol 
extension, (a) WLAN NODE 1. (b) WLAN NODE 2. (c) WLAN NODE 3.
crease in its number of retransmissions, rising from 290.90 in the non-frame-relayed sce­
narios to 369.81 in the frame-relayed scenarios, an increase of 27%. WLAN MODE 2, 
which is closer to the relay network activity, increased from 312.37 retransmissions to 439.32, 
an increase of 40%. The final station, which has to contend for media access with each 
relayed message transmitted through the wLAN, had increased from 306.40 retransmis­
sions to 496.23, an increase of 61%. This data provides proof that other stations not in­
volved in the protocol extension experience worse performance the closer the station is 
located to the Isolated Station.
Effects of RTS/CTS on the Protocol Extension
All of the simulations previously discussed were executed without utilization of the 
RTS/CTS provided by IEEE 802.11. Recall from Chapter 3 that RTS/CTS is the mecha-
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Table 5-37: WLAN NODEs 1-3 retransmission attempts in number o f attempts, (a) With­
out invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Attempt* Attenpts
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 1 Node 2 Node 3
Shubtipn  1 233.50 351.87 298.4 62.37 68.36 62.98
Simulation 2 286.55 315.01 279.85 83.11 51.49 68,17
Slmditkm 3 .112.98 275.72 360.94 81.31 69.90 61.69
Simulation 4 295.65 281.65 300.59 76.07 68.23 55 09
S k m h tb n S 325.82 337.60 292.22 50.60 66.37 70.39
Sample M ean 290.90 312.37 306.40 70.69 64.X7 63.66
Sample Mean Standard Deviation
Attrnptt Alton pti
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 1 Node 2 Node 3
Smufrhor 6 320.47 499.52 425.23 173.69 88.63 117.78
SmAlion 7 349.09 434.36 523.29 151.96 9.1.39 136.08
Sirniatbn 8 449.16 479.08 522.94 212,96 113.39 168.23
Smd»tiofl9 448.35 423.37 473.83 23.1.14 137.08 101.59
Sbvlatbn tO 282.00 360.27 535.86 128.77 81.60 109.40
Sample Mean 369.81 4.19.32 496.23 180.10 189.31 126.61
(a) (b)
Figure 5-38: WLAN NODEs 1-3 retransmission attempts in number of attempts with and 
without invoking the protocol extension, (a) WLAN NODE 1. (b) WLAN NODE 2. (c) 
WLAN NODE 3.
nism implemented by IEEE 802.11 to allow a station to reserve the wLAN’s bandwidth 
long enough to transmit a message, rationalizing that the retransmission of RTS/CTS pack­
ets is cheaper and are more likely to avoid collision than potentially very long data packets. 
To analyze the effects of RTS/CTS on the protocol extension, simulations one and six were 
executed with RTS/CTS enabled with a threshold of 256 octets. The results of these simu­
lations are presented in graphs in Figures 5-39, 5-40, and 5-41. A NIL Packet Pointer error 
which occurred in the RTS/CTS-enabied version of the frame-relayed scenario caused ex­
ecution to terminate two-thirds the way through the simulation. Even though the simulation 
did not finish, the performance comparison strongly shows the improvement enjoyed by the 
frame relay protocol extension.
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It was found that although global performance worsened for each scenario when 
RTS/CTS was enabled, the protocol extension benefitted immensely. In the non-frame- 
relayed scenario, throughput decreased from 3,991 kbps when RTS/CTS was disabled to 
3,879 kbps when RTS/CTS was enabled. In the frame-relayed scenario, throughput de­
creased from 3,607 kbps to 3,356 kbps. Relayed throughput, on the other hand, enjoyed an 
increase of 95 kbps (416%) with the activation of the RTS/CTS mechanism, increasing 
from 30 kbps to 125 kbps., Delay for relayed data also improved significantly, dropping
Figure 5-39: Global throughput for the wLAN in bits/sec with and without RTS/CTS en­
abled. (a) Without invoking the protocol extension, (b) Invoking the protocol extension.
Figure 5-40: Global relayed throughput for the wLAN in bits/sec with and without RTS/ 
CTS enabled.
from 6.59 seconds per packet to 1.51 seconds per packet. These results clearly show that 
the use of the RTS/CTS mechanism was significantly beneficial to the protocol extension.
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In this thesis, a method to increase the coverage area of a wireless LAN through the 
modification of existing wireless LAN protocols was proposed. The proposed protocol 
extension does not require additional hardware to an existing wLAN as long as the original 
MAC and Physical layers meet specific requirements. The structure of the protocol exten­
sion as it is defined in Chapter 2 does, however, require the inclusion of new data structures, 
timers, counters, and executable code, all of which are inserted into either the firmware or 
the device driver. Several new relay-specific message types are introduced, each respon­
sible for carrying authentication, connection-setup, connection-termination, and data ex­
change information, depending on the state of the system. The issue of security between the 
isolated station and the access point was considered in the design of the protocol extension. 
Both public-key and symmetric algorithms are incorporated to encrypt and protect mes­
sages exchanged between the access point and the isolated station. This ensures that an 
attacker cannot either establish a relayed network session pretending as another wireless 
station, nor can an attacker alter the origination, destination, or the contents of relayed data.
To prove that the protocol extension is functionally complete, an existing interna­
tional wireless LAN standard, IEEE 802.11. was chosen to receive the modifications to 
support the functionality defined by the protocol extension. It should be noted that IEEE 
802.11 satisfactorily meets all of the requirements demanded by the proposed protocol ex­
tension. To implement the updated version of IEEE 802.11 and to measure its effects on
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performance in a controlled environment, an existing model of IEEE 802.11 supplied in 
OPNET 7.0.B vvas modified and tested. A test bed of ten simulations were executed, five 
which did not employ the protocol extension, and five which did. The results of each group 
of simulations were averaged together to produce a sample mean to better approximate the 
true performance of the protocol extension. A separate simulation involving the use of the 
RTS/CTS mechanism was also performed.
The protocol extension did impact performance, as was expected. However, the 
results of the simulation showed that the impact was much more severe than expected. The 
protocol extension did allow an isolated station to exchange data between itself and the 
access point through a relay station. It effectively increased the access point’s coverage 
area, but the performance loss was much more severe than expected. Although the wLAN 
as a whole experienced only a moderate amount of throughput loss, the isolated station 
experienced a throughput loss of as much as 91%, and delays of as long as six seconds. This 
clearly shows that this protocol extension is currently not feasible for any type of real-time 
or throughput-intensive applications. The protocol extension was also proven to have ad­
verse effects to the other wireless stations associated with the wLAN, with performance 
worsening with the increasing reception of relayed messages.
It was also shown that relayed throughput improved considerably with the inclusion 
of IEEE 802.11 ’s RTS/CTS mechanism. Although overall throughput for the wLAN expe­
rienced slightly worse performance, relayed throughput increased by as much as 400%, 
while relayed message delay decreased by a similar ratio. The use of RTS/CTS clearly aids 
the Isolated Station in eliminating much of the retransmissions, and hence the “backoff 
penalty” which significantly diminished its effectiveness in all of the previous trials.
Future Research
Although this protocol extension is functionally complete, there remains much to it
which could be improved. Throughput and performance was found to be a major issue
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which must be improved. Although collision-avoidance/contention-relief mechanisms such 
as RTS/CTS. may improve performance, it still would not undo the bottleneck which occurs 
when RDFO messages wait at the relay station for the RFI message to push the messages 
forward to the end station.
The synchronous structure of the protocol extension also lends itself to inefficiency. 
Because the RFI message contains descriptor data about RDFO messages which arrived 
ahead of itself, relayed messages must not be lost or discarded. This leads to potentially 
long backoff timers which serve to reduce throughput and increase delay to levels such that 
the destination might have timed out and issued a retransmission request, which would 
further decrease throughput as observed by the application. Clearly, if the processing of the 
RFI message can handle RDFO messages which were discarded rather thar forcing an un­
limited number of retransmissions, throughput should increase and delay should decrease.
Even though ample security is provided between the access point and the isolated 
station, the relay station is still the weakest link in a relayed network session. Since the 
isolated station is likely to be outside the transmission range of a centralized public-key 
repository', it is not feasible to assume that the isolated station can have the public key for 
every potential relay station it may attempt to contact. Therefore, there is no encryption or 
digital signatures to protect the relay station from being the source or target of certain types 
of attack.
One type of attack is on the TRS message, which lacks any authentication whatso­
ever to determine who transmitted the message. So, it is possible for any attacker to spoof 
the message, yielding a termination of the connection setup phase or the relayed network 
service phase. The unique identifiers present in the RFI message which are not protected by 
a digital signature are also vulnerable to attack.
During the relayed network service phase, the only control message exchanged be­
tween the isolated station and the access point is the RFI message. Other control messages
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may be added to the protocol extension to introduce new functionality. A good example 
would be a means for the transport of new session digital signature keys, which would oe 
periodically regenerated during the life of the relayed network session. Frequently chang­
ing the digital signature during the life of the relayed connection would increase the diffi­





Other Methods to Increase the Wireless LAN Coverage Area 
In addition to the software-based Relayed Frame Protocol Extension presented in 
this study, there exists hardware-based alternatives to increase a wireless LAN’s coverage 
area. These devices, called Extension Points, are dedicated stations, which are added to an 
existing wireless LAN. There are at least two models of Extension Points currently avail­
able on the market.
One of these Extension Points is manufactured by Proxim, Inc., the RangeLAN2 
7540 Series Extension Point. It increases the size of the coverage area without sacrificing 
performance (as observed in Chapter 5) through the intelligent use of MISS. by using a 
hopping code that is orthogonal to the code used by the primary wireless LAN in the ex­
tended coverage area. In addition, the extension point possesses two receivers and trans­
mitters, so data could be in transit between itself and the access point, and between itself 
and the isolated stations simultaneously. Proxim claims that the extended coverage area 
could enjoy a throughput as high as 1.6 Mbps, considerably higher than the throughput 
experienced by the Isolated Station in the simulation. [RaOi]
Another Extension Point which is available is the Orinoco Range Extender An­
tenna, produced by Agere Systems (formerly the Microelectronics Group of Lucent Tech­
nologies). It is capable of boosting the size of the open coverage area by as much as 50- 
100% (and up to 15-30% with obstructions), depending on the number of extender antennas 
which are added to the wireless LAN. [OrOl]
1 0 8
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Most of the time, the coverage area of a wireless LAN that provides access to a 
wired LAN infrastructure is created by a cluster of cells. The coverage area of each cell in 
the cluster is provided by an access point, which is connected to the wired distribution 
infrastructure. All of these cells combined form an aggregate coverage area equal to the 
sum of its parts. A wireless station may seamlessly travel across many cells. This seamless 
transfer of network access between access points is called a handover. There are a number 
of research involved in the study of the efficiency of these network of cells, and many 
proposed algorithms to increase performance and handover efficiency.
For example, in [MiH96], a handover mechanism for intra-switch handovers for 
wireless ATM was discussed. The proposed handover mechanism is compatible with ATM 
cell relay principles and supports the quality of service requirements of multimedia ser­
vices. An overview of the architecture of wireless ATM was discussed to familiarize the 
reader with the environment for which the handover mechanism is designed. In addition, 
the internal workings of the proposed handover mechanism and many of the issues which 
had to be overcome were explored in detail. For proof of concept, and to measure perfor­
mance metrics, the handover mechanism was modeled in a simulation using Ptolemy, a 
public domain simulation tool.
In [Ch96], Chai-Keong Toh introduced a hybrid handover protocol which groups 
together several wireless ATM cells to form a larger macrocell in a Multi-' ler Wireless Cells 
Clustering Architecture. The goal of the architecture is to increase the speed of the handover 
process and to reduce the amount of messaging required to complete the process. Each cell 
within a macrocell is connected to a shared cluster switch which functions as the handover 
management entity, resulting in fast and highly efficient handovers in intra-cluster migra­
tions. The macrocells are interconnected with the backbone network, with inter-cluster 
migrations being slower and less efficient than intra-cluster migrations. Design issues, such 
as locality exploitation, radio hints, resource reuse, scalability, mobile quality of service.
disruption time, cell loss & sequencing, mobile station motion behavior, data looping, ro­
bustness, and queueing were all addressed in this research.
All of the research discussed up to this point focused on a wireless LAN architecture 
which is connected to a wired distribution infrastructure. The Frame Relaying Protocol 
Extension and Extension Point devices increase the coverage area of a single access point, 
which itself is connected to a wired network. The handover mechanisms presented all use 
access points which are also similarly connected. Networks which are completely devoid 
of any wired infrastructure or central administration are called ad hoc networks. [Ge99] 
Typically, in an ad hoc network, wireless stations communicate directly with one another in 
a “cloud” of wireless stations. However, it is possible that in a large ad hoc wireless net­
work, there could be two stations that wish to exchange data with each other, but are outside 
of each other’s transmission ranges. This problem gives rise to the need for an ad hoc 
routing protocol
In [BoM99], Bose, Morin, Stojmenovi'c, and Urrutia discussed several algorithms 
for routing, broadcasting and geocasting in an ad hoc wireless network environment. For 
each algorithm, the ad hoc wireless network was modeled in a unit graph, where each wire­
less station is a point in a plane, and stations may communicate if the distance between the 
two of them does not exceed their maximum transmission range. None of the algorithms 
require global information about the unit graph; each station is only aware of its neighbors 
that are within its transmission range. None the algorithms require the duplication of pack­
ets or memory at the nodes, and packet delivery to its destination is guaranteed. Two rout­
ing algorithms, FACE-1 and FACE-2, are examined and proved mathematically to work. 
The routing algorithms are then extended to produce two new algorithms: BROADCAST 
(used when a oacket from an originating station is to be received by all member stations in 
the ad hoc wireless network) and GEOCAST (broadcasting to stations within a region rather 
than the entire wireless LAN.)
110
Many ad hoc routing algorithms are dependent on a connected dominating set. Since 
the arrangement of wireless stations in an ad hoc wireless network is dynamic (stations can 
and do power up and down, and move from one location to another without limitation), any 
algorithm to calculate a connected dominating set that is used by an ad hoc routing algo­
rithm must be fast, efficient, and able to cope with change. In [WuL99], Jie Wu and Hailan 
Li proposed an algorithm which can quickly generate a dominating set for a given con­
nected graph and is able to handle the dynamic nature of an ad hoc wireless LAN. They 
compared their algorithm against those proposed in several previous third-party works (such 
as the cluster-based algorithm, the approximation algorithm, and dynamic source routing) 
in studies of algorithm complexity and performance analysis via simulation.
Other Research in Wireless LAN Security
In recent years, there has been an explosion of research in the fields of security and 
cryptography. The importance of these fields continues to escalate as more and more sensi­
tive information is transferred across networks, and as the public awareness of data security 
continues to increase. The issue of security is even more important with wireless LANs in 
comparison to traditional wired LANs, since invaders do not require physical access to the 
network. The works of several authors are discussed in this section of the chapter.
In [PaG98], by Se Hyun Park, Aura Ganz, and Zvi Ganz, a method to provide secu­
rity and orivacy for IEEE 802.11 is discussed. Their security protocol takes advantage of 
IEEE 802.11 ’s Point Coordination Function, using the point coordinator as a centralized 
controller to manage authentication and the exchange of session keys. The designers also 
took into consideration issues which arise from the operating characteristics of wireless 
LANs, such as low bandwidth, minimization of the security overhead incurred by the proto­
col, low power consumption, noise and packet loss, and a computationally inexpensive 
cryptographic algorithm. The publication concluded with a comparison of the proposed 
security protocol with other approaches to wireless security.
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Another wireless LAN security protocol was proposed in “Secure Wireless LANs”, 
by V. Bharghavan. This security protocol was designed to be implementable over any wire­
less LAN technology whose operating environment meets a small number of assumptions. 
Bharghavan’s security mode! differs from [PaG98] with the fact that it was designed specifi­
cally for mobile computing, rather than the peer-to-peer connectivity in the wireless LAN 
itself. In Bharghavan's model, a mobile station establishes a connection only with a Home 
Computer, accessing the distribution system to reach this system through the wireless LAN. 
This Home Computer is a trusted entity, a potential Home Agent [Pe97], and the Control­
ling Authority for the exchange of keys between itself, the mobile station, and the access 
point in the security protocol. The security protocol supports both authentication upon 
power-on and upon handoff, each optimized to improve the protocol’s efficiency in both 
situations. [Bh94]
Other Efforts in Wireless LAN Simulation
Simulations are cost-effective and powerful methods to explore the operation and 
the performance of new protocols, algorithms, and arrangements of wireless LAN hard­
ware. With powerful tools such as OPNET, the effects of changes to an existing architec­
ture, which may be difficult to measure with real hardware, may be measured and examined 
with relative ease. There exist, several studies that discuss the intricacies and the effective­
ness of simulating wireless LANs.
In [BaDOl], by Rusty O. Baldwin, Nathaniel J. Davis IV, and Scott F. Midkiff, the 
process they used to develop a simulation model of the IEEE 802.11 standard was dis­
cussed. The authors state that the official IEEE 802.11 specification defines its protocol 
operation in both text and in a formal specification language, SDL-92. The authors chose to 
map objects defined in the SDL-92 formatted documentation to avoid the ambiguity which 
could result from various interpretations of the text, to OPNET 3.0.B objects. This tech­
nique significantly shortened the amount of time required to construct the model, requiring
only 250 hours to develop and debug. The internal design of the model and its validation 
were discussed, including the fact that the model was an incomplete implementation of 
IEEE 802.11, lacking encryption, authentication, power-save mode functions, fragmenta­
tion, and the PCF.
A simulation of IEEE 802.11 \s asynchronous medium-access performance was re­
searched by G. Anastasi and L. Lenzini. Instead of simulating the wireless LAN in OPNET, 
like [BaDOl], the authors developed their own ad-hoc simulator in C++. The document 
began with an overview of the IEEE 802.11 standard and its operating structure, then pro­
ceeded to discuss the internal structure of the simulation. The topic of traffic characteriza­
tion was the first to be addressed. Traffic arrived into the system through a Poisson and an 
Interrupted Poisson Process. Packet sizes were calculated from a probability mass function 
generated from data by previous third-party research efforts.
Next, the types of performance measurements that were analyzed, such as average 
queuing delay, MAC delay, media access delay, and aggregate throughput, are explained. 
The discussion then turned to evaluating the performance of IEEE 802.11 with and without 
the use of the RTS/CTS medium reservation mechanism, proving that the use of RTS/CTS 
improved aggregate throughput and average access delay. The effects of slot-time duration 
were also addressed, proving that maximum achievable throughput decreases as slot dura­
tion increases.
Finally, the performance of the IEEE 802.11 standard as the data rate increases was 
analyzed. In [AnLOO], it was demonstrated that because of the fixed slot-time for all data 
rates, IEEE 802.11’s effectiveness decreases as the wireless LAN’s bit rate increases. The 
final analysis examined unbalanced load environments (compared to a uniform load by all 
stations, a characteristic of all previous simulations), analyzing IEEE 802.11 ’s effectiveness 
in a situation where the offered load from each member station varies. This analysis dem­
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onstrated that stations with higher loads experienced very large queuing delays, on the order 
of several seconds with moderate network loads.
In [Ru98], Leslie Rubinstein discussed a method to model cell site coverage pat­
terns in OPNET through ray tracing techniques. The author stated that ray tracing is a 
viable alternative of computing radio propagation since RF, like light, is affected by refrac­
tion, penetration, and multiple object interrcflections. The use of ray tracing provides a 
more realistic and complete simulation of the effects of objects and terrain on the propaga­
tion of radio waves, and would not require the development of new modules to simulate an 
environmental feature. Also, by starting the radio-propagation path trace from the receiver 
rather than the originator, the simulation software was able to disregard all of the other rays 
from the originator which would not be received by the destination, reducing its computa­
tional load to only the subset of radio waves which do reach its intended target.
After discussing the problem domain and the proposed solution, Rubinstein dis­
cussed the structure the OPNET model which takes advantage of this ray tracing technique. 
OPNET’s radio pipeline was briefly discussed, surveying the changes to it that are required 
to support the ray-tracing of radio waves. Data storage is another topic discussed, address­
ing the issue of maintaining a database of the features of the surrounding environment (build­
ings, etc.) in the model. Object descriptions were also addressed, including shape, size, 
reflection, refraction, and transparency- Location of the source, destination, and objects and 





Acceptance of Relaying Service - One of the new messages defined in the protocol exten­
sion. The isolated station transmits this message to the station which it has chosen to serve 
as its relay station.
Acceptance of Relaying Sendee Acknowledgment - One of the new messages defined in 
the protocol extension. This message is sent by the relay station to the isolated station to 
acknowledge that it has received the isolated station’s notification that it was chosen for 
relaying sendees.
Access Point - A wireless station which senes as a bridge between the wireless LAN and a 
distribution system.
Acknowledgment of Relayed Communication Session - One of the new messages defined 
in the protocol extension. The isolated station sends this message back to the access point 
to notify it that it had successfully received an RsRCS message.
Acknowledgment of Relayed Communication Session Acknowledgment - One of the new 
messages defined in the protocol extension. The access point sends this message to the 
isolated station to notify it that its ARCS message was received.
ARCS - See Acknowledgment of Relayed Communication Session.
ARCS_ACK - See Acknowledgment of Relayed Communication Session Acknowledg­
ment.
ARS - See Acceptance of Relaying Service.
ARS_ACK - See Acceptance of Relaying Service Acknowledgment.
Association - The process of mapping a station to the distribution system through an access 
point.
Authentication - The process of a station positively identifying itself to another, usually the 
access point, during network session setup.
Ciphertext - Data that has been encrvpted.
Coverage Area - The total area that a wireless station’s transmissions may be received by 
another station and is still intelligible.
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Frame - A synonym for a datagram, which is transmitted across the network media. In this 
thesis, the frame refers to the MAC layer datagram format.
IEEE - Institute for Electrical and Electionic Engineers.
IEEE 802.11 - A wireless LAN MAC protocol, designed by IEEE.
Isolated Station - In this thesis, the isolated station refers to a wireless station which is 
beyond the access point and wishes to join the network.
LAN - Abbreviation for Local Area Network.
MAC Frame Relaying Protocol Extension - Complete title of the protocol extension de­
scribed in this thesis. Also referred to as ‘protocol extension’ or ‘frame relaying protocol 
extension’.
MAC Layer - Medium Access Control Layer. This layer controls the use of the underlying 
network medium. Is located in the Data Link Layer in the OSI Reference Model.
NAP - Abbreviation for Network A c c e s s  Point.
Plaintext - Data that had not been encrypted.
RCD - See Relayed Communication Denied.
RDFO - See Relay Data Frame Class 0.
RDF1 - See Relay Data Frame Class 1.
Relay Data Frame Class 0 - One of the new messages defined in the protocol extension. 
This data frame carries relay descriptor data in its payload, eliminating the need for an 
accompanying RFI message.
Relay Data mame Class 1 - One of the new messages defined in the protocol extension. 
This data frame does not carry relay descrintor data, and is therefore dependent on an ac­
companying RFI message.
Relay Frame Information - One of the new messages defined in the protocol extension. 
This message carries descriptor information for the RDFO messages transmitted ahead of 
itself.
Relay Station - A station previously a s s o c ia te d  with a wireless LAN which agrees to pro­
vide relay s e n d e e s  to an isolated station.
Relayed C o m m u n ic a t io n  Denied - One of th e  n e w  messages defined in the protocol exten­
sion. The a c c e s s  p o in t  sends this message b a c k  to the isolated station, through the relay 
s ta t io n ,  to  n o t i f y  i t  t h a t  a relayed n e tw o r k  s e s s io n  h a s  b e e n  denied at the moment.
Relayed C o n n e c t io n  Establishment - T h e  f i r s t  phase of the frame relaying protocol exten­
sion. In th i s  p h a s e  t h e  relayed n e tw o r k  s e s s io n  is  established.
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Relayed Network Service - The second phase of the frame relaying protocol extension. In 
this phase, application data is exchanged between the access point and the isolated station 
through the relay station.
Relayed Session Termination - This is the final phase of the frame relaying protocol exten­
sion. The process of dismantling an existing relayed network session takes place here.
Request for Relayed Communications Session - One of the new messages defined in the 
protocol extension. The isolated station transmits this message to the access point (through 
the relay station) to request a relayed network session.
Request for Service - One of the new messages defined by the protocol extension. The 
purpose of this message is to notify all receivers that the broadcasting station is searching 
for a station to serve as its relay station.
Response to Relayed Communication Session - One of the new messages defined in the 
protocol extension. This message is sent from the access point to the isolated station through 
the relay station, notifying the end station that a relayed network session has been granted. 
Response to Request for Service - One of the new messages defined in the protocol exten­
sion. A prospective relay station transmits this message back to the isolated station after 
having received an RFS message and has decided to provide relay services to the request­
ing stadon.
RFi - See Relayed Frame Information.
RFS - See Request for Service
RRCS - See Request for Relayed Communications Session.
RRFS - See Response to Request for Service
RsRCS - See Response to Relayed Communication Session.
Terminate Relay Session - One c f the new messages defined in the protocol extension. This 
message is sent by one of the three stations involved in the relayed network session. Its task 
is to notify the other stations that the relayed network session is to be terminated.
TRS - See Terminate Relay Session.




This appendix features the algorithm of the protocol extension discussed in Chapter 2 in a 
finite state diagram format (FAS). The purpose of these diagrams is to provide a visual aid 
to supplement the detailed description of the protocol extension. It may also be helpful in 
designing an implementation of the protocol extension, whether it would be in a simulated 
environment or an actual implementation. Do not confuse these finite state machines with 
those used in OPNET. The finite state diagrams in this appendix describe the algorithm of 
the protocol extension, while OPNET finite state machines are an actual model implemen­
tation of an algorithm, and are readily executable by the simulation software.
The first FAS describes the algorithm used by the isolated station in the Relayed 
Connection Establishment phase. The second FAS covers both the Relayed Network Ser­
vice and Relayed Session Termination phases for the isolated station. The third FAS com­
pletely documents the frame relay protocol extension’s algorithm for the relay station, and 
the fourth FAS documents all of the phases for the access point.
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Figure B
-l: Finite state diagram
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Figure C -l: Complete timeline for relayed network session establishment.
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